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ABSTRACT 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) units are expected to perform a wide variety of missions 
under diverse conditions. They are considered a strategic tool, and as such, the price for 
failure is correspondingly high. The speed of reaction and the degree of flexibility are the 
key traits of SOF units. As the task environment of SOF units has grown in complexity, 
the amount of information available has grown too. As a result, the channels and the 
people could become overloaded, and in unstable and fluid environments, a unit can 
become less flexible, less capable of learning and ultimately less effective. The ability to 
learn as an organization is very important in a long-term perspective 
This study analyzes what facilitates a SOF unit as a learning organization 
characterized by a quick and flexible response to new information. The overarching 
framework is that “intelligent failure,” framing and reframing, balanced exploitation and 
exploration, environment of psychological safety, managers’ tasks supportive of 
organizational learning, learning teams, and mental models, selection of personnel, 
learning infrastructure, and being organized to learn are procedural and structural 
elements that facilitate organizational learning. Organizational learning of SOF units is 
fostered by an environment of psychological safety, and occurs through direct interaction. 
Establishing the processes that allow for safe reporting, and creating environment that 
supports open dialogue and discussion that encourage knowledge gain and transfer. SOF 
members’ ability to cross boundaries helps bring in new ideas and insights, and tolerance 
of failure in support of learning supports transfer of knowledge, and allows for faster and 
broader learning.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  OVERVIEW .....................................................................................................1 
B.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE .................................................................................2 
C.  BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 
D.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................5 




A.  RELATION TO ORGANIZATIONS ..........................................................11 
B.  THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING ................11 
C.  OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING ...............................11 
1.  How Do Organizations Learn? .........................................................12 
2.  Is It that Easy? ...................................................................................14 
3.  How to Solve the Challenge? .............................................................15 
D.  ACHIEVING ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING .....................................16 
1.   Procedural Elements ..........................................................................16 
a.  Framing and Reframing .........................................................16 
b.  Intelligent Failure ...................................................................17 
c.  Balanced Exploration and Exploitation ................................20 
d.  Established Environment of Psychological Safety ................21 
e.  Managers’s Tasks ...................................................................22 
2.  Structural Elements ...........................................................................23 
a.  Learning Teams: their Size and Mix ......................................23 
b.  Managerial Mental Models ....................................................26 
c.  Selection of Personnel ............................................................28 
d.  Learning Infrastructure ..........................................................31 
e.  Organized to Learn vs. Organized to Execute .......................33 
III.  EFFECTIVE LEARNING (CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT) ............................37 

















C.  MEASURING LEARNING ..........................................................................44 
1.  Need for a Measurement ...................................................................44 
2.  Successful Practices ...........................................................................44 
D.  WHERE TO START .....................................................................................45 
IV.  CHALLENGES TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING ......................................47 
A.  LEARNING DISABILITIES ACCORDING TO PETER SENGE ..........47 
B.   LEARNING DISABILITIES BY GARVIN ................................................50 
C.  CAPABILITY LEARNING TRAPS BY HARRISON AND BOYLE ......52 
V.  ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: THE SOF PERSPECTIVE .........................57 
A.  MILITARY AND SOF PERSPECTIVE .....................................................57 
1.  Strategy ...............................................................................................57 
a.  Military ....................................................................................57 
b.   SOF .........................................................................................58 
2.  Structure: Military versus SOF ........................................................58 
a.  Military ....................................................................................58 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................59 
3.  Systems: Military versus SOF...........................................................59 
a.  Military ....................................................................................59 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................59 
4.  Shared Values: Military versus SOF ................................................60 
a.  Military ....................................................................................60 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................60 
5.  Style: Military versus SOF ................................................................61 
a.  Military ....................................................................................61 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................61 
6.  Staff: Military versus SOF ................................................................61 
a.  Military ....................................................................................61 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................62 
7.  Skills: Military versus SOF ...............................................................62 
a.  Military ....................................................................................62 
b.  SOF ..........................................................................................63 
B.  SUMMARY OF COMPARISON .................................................................63 
VI.  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ..............................................................................65 
A.  METHODS DESCRIPTION ........................................................................65 
1.  Survey Design and Description .........................................................65 
2.  Survey Pretesting and Fielding .........................................................65 
3.  Survey Respondents ...........................................................................67 
4.  Response Rates ...................................................................................70 
5.  Interview .............................................................................................70 
B.  SURVEY RESULTS ......................................................................................72 
 ix
1.  Conclusions from SOF as a Learning Organization survey ..........76 
C.  INTERVIEW RESULTS ..............................................................................76 
1.  Overview .............................................................................................76 
2.  Challenges ...........................................................................................77 
a.  Tacit, Practical Knowledge .....................................................77 
b.  Collaboration ...........................................................................79 
c.  Bureaucratic Chain of Command ..........................................79 
d.  Limited Transfer of Knowledge ..............................................80 
e.  Direct Action Focus ................................................................81 
f.  Limited Support .......................................................................81 
g.  Lack of Trust ...........................................................................82 
3.  Themes ................................................................................................82 
VII.  CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................103 
A.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................................103 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................106 
1.  Create Environment of Psychological Safety ................................106 
2.  Make Use of Failures .......................................................................107 
3.  Make Use of Temporary Teams .....................................................107 
4.  Support Sharing ...............................................................................107 
5.  Leadership’s Role in Creating Psychological Safety:  Model 
and Reward Learning and Innovation ...........................................108 
APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT ........................................................................109 
APPENDIX B. RECRUITMENT LETTERS ...................................................................121 
APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL .....................................................................127 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................131 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................137 
 
 x
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  Dynamics of learning organizations ..................................................................7 
Figure 2.  McKinsey 7S model .........................................................................................37 
Figure 3.  Respondent nationalities: U.S. vs. International ..............................................67 
Figure 4.  Respondents by country ...................................................................................68 
Figure 5.  Distribution of respondent ranks ......................................................................69 
Figure 6.  Ranking comparison by component.................................................................72 
Figure 7.  Direct comparison of mean responses by component ......................................74 
 
 xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAR  After Action Report, also After Action Review 
ANSF  Afghan National Security Force 
CAS  Close Air Support 
CONOP Concept of Operation 
NATO  Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
SEALs  U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land units/personnel 
SITREP Situational Report 
SODARS Special Operations Debrief and Retrieval System 
SOF  Special Operations Forces 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The need to find innovative solutions and to learn as an organization is of utmost 
importance. Gaining insight into and understanding the dynamics of the organizational 
learning process within SOF is a key first step in illuminating this importance. 
Being the part of larger military forces, SOF bear some of the same 
characteristics. SOF is not as strongly hierarchical and bureaucratically “tall” as a 
conventional military unit, but still is bureaucratic and hierarchical. Also, SOF’s 
peacetime engagement in a diverse set of activities, their smaller size, and their internal 
culture supporting bottom-up approaches, may support effect on organizational learning. 
On the other hand, a high operational tempo and high turnover of personnel may limit 
organizational learning as it may limit sharing knowledge and insights. Based on this 
comparison, SOF are better suited for organizational learning. However, in order to 
become a learning organization, SOF still needs to make adjustments or changes within 
their organizational structure and practices. 
There are four areas with elements supportive of organizational learning, which 
are underutilized. When focusing on improvement of organizational learning, 
improvement in these areas, or changing approaches that are causes of this 
underutilization might be the first studied. These areas are: intelligent failure, learning 
teams, psychological safety, and learning infrastructure. 
The data collected through the interviews yielded ten recurring themes related to 
organizational learning, these are: 
1. Sharing knowledge through written reports and standardized formats is 
important but not sufficient for understanding the complexity and 
emerging challenges that are not anticipated. 
2. Discovering insight through questioning and storytelling. 
3. Sharing knowledge is effectively done through open and frank discussion. 
4. Learning often requires crossing presumed boundaries.   
 xiv
5. New insights and innovative solutions are often generated outside of the 
team or unit. 
6. Innovation is triggered by an inadequacy or deficiency in the unit. 
7. Seeking new information is limited if the individual or organization is 
limited to a narrow set of missions. 
8. The larger the unit, the less it is able to innovate and learn. 
9. A delay occurs between the moment of insight and its application. 
10. Useful training is not always applied in combat. 
Thus, here are the answers to the research questions posed in this thesis: 
1. What are the internal and external conditions that facilitate rapid learning and 
flexible responses in a SOF unit? Rapid learning is facilitated by an environment where 
people feel free to speak openly and safe to take interpersonal risks, and through direct 
interaction, i.e., open and frank discussion. 
2. What internal processes in a SOF unit can be established to facilitate rapid and 
flexible responses to new information and situations? Establishing processes that allow 
reporting safe from retaliation and creating environments that support open dialogue and 
discussion are supportive to knowledge gain and transfer. Training personnel in 
collaborative skills and increasing their ability to cross boundaries helps bring in new 
ideas and insights, especially when the insights originate outside the unit. Conditioning 
personnel to see modest failure as a valuable part of learning supports the transfer of 
knowledge and allows faster and broader learning. The use of temporary learning teams 
improves knowledge gain and sharing. 
Five recommendations aimed for a SOF unit trying to improve its learning were 
generated: 
1.  Create an environment of psychological safety 
2.  Make use of failures 
3.  Make use of temporary teams 
4.  Support sharing 
 xv
5.  Leadership’s role in creating psychological safety: Model and reward 
learning and innovation 
 xvi
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
During the last two decades, majority of Special Operations Forces (SOF) units 
experienced an increased frequency in their deployments. This increase, plus the fact that 
SOF operate across almost the whole spectrum of conflict, the growing complexity of 
task environment, and the growing amount of information available through various 
channels, increasingly burden SOF units and operators. Under such conditions, a SOF 
unit is exposed to large amount of ambiguous and often conflicting information, complex 
problems to solve, and the need to react discriminately and effectively. The need to find 
innovative solutions and to learn as an organization is of an utmost importance. Gaining 
insight into and understanding the dynamics of organizational learning within SOF is the 
early step while addressing this importance. 
This study attempts to take a balanced approach to research, and to examine SOF 
from the perspective of a learning organization. The background of the framework used 
rested upon the knowledge presented by major scholars relevant to the field of 
organizational learning. Author’s motivation is based on the assumption, that the 
changing and evolving nature of SOF task environment together with its complexity 
requires SOF to be skillful in learning in order to stay contemporary. 
The initial two chapters of this study present and describe the framework used for 
data collection and their analysis. The subsequent chapters describe a learning 
organization, conventional military organization, and SOF using the McKinsey 7S model 
for successful organizational change. 
The analysis of the data collected yielded two sets of results. The data collected 
through survey produced a comparison of SOF subjects and allowed to demonstrate the 
differences in the presence of ten elements supportive to organizational learning amongst 
these subjects. The data collected through the interviews yielded ten recurring themes 
related to organizational learning in SOF.  
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B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what facilitates the transformation of a 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit into a learning organization characterized by quick 
and flexible response to new information.1 This research will focus on procedural and 
structural components that characterize learning organizations, the presence and use of 
such components within NATO and allied SOF units, and how they can be successfully 
replicated within SOF units that face the challenge of organizational learning. 
The outcomes of this thesis will be descriptions of structural components, 
processes, and best practices that are useful for a SOF unit pursuing the aim of becoming 
a learning organization and optimizing itself to achieve better responsiveness to new 
information. 
The scope of this thesis includes the NATO and allied SOF community; 
conclusions will be based on comparisons of the internal structural and procedural 
components of member organizations. The thesis will cover those processes and 
structural components that are related to organizational learning, both positively and 
negatively. A SOF unit, as part of a bureaucratic organization, is generally not well suited 
for organizational learning and innovation. As SOF units have different structures and 
degrees of system rigidity, their ability to learn and innovate will differ as well. In 
general, the closer to the bureaucratic end of the spectrum, the harder it is to innovate. 
Although this is a simplification, it is safe to assume that an organization relying mostly 
on rules and SOPs is constrained when it comes to innovation and learning. For instance, 
Jan Bloch observed that militaries were often unable to keep up with environmental 
                                                 
1  In order to be able to discuss the issues of a learning organization, and to consider speed of learning, 
there is a need to ground the discussion on a theoretical framework. For a learning organization, David 
Garvin’s definition, “A learning organization is an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and 
transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.” David A. 
Garvin, “Building a Learning Organization,” Business Credit 96, no. 1 (1994): 20, and for a speed of 
learning Ralph Catalanello’s from Northern Illinois University describes the speed of learning as “how fast 
organizations are able to rotate around the learning cycle,” and the cycle as “planning, implementation, 
reflection.” Ralph F. Catalanello, “Speed, Depth and Breadth: Assessing Learning in Learning 
Organizations,” Developments in Business Simulation & Experimental Exercises 21 (1994): 143, will be 
used. 
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changes.2 Similarly, coalition troops struggling to adjust their approaches to situations in 
Iraq or Afghanistan underscore the importance of flexible learning. With faster 
organizational learning, a SOF unit can become more effective. In a security environment 
where the aim is to overcome the enemy, one of the proven principles has always been 
surprise; innovation helps create surprise. The aim of showing up on the battlefield 
unexpectedly, or with something new, is much easier to reach once an organization 
improves its learning ability. The question is: Can a SOF unit overcome the challenge of 
its bureaucratic origins and become a learning organization?   
The focus of this study is on SOF tactical units. There are differences among 
NATO and allied SOF units, as far as placement within the command structure is 
concerned (e.g., each chain of command contains a different number of levels, and these 
levels differ in nature, which in turn shifts responsibilities and authorities vertically); also 
the layout of their task environment differs greatly.3 More important, the factors outside 
the unit are beyond the control of unit leadership. Learning happens within the unit itself.  
Many factors such as education, training, common practices, unit size, and 
deployments have an influence on the quality of unit members and their experience. 
Variations among units may offer some explanations for the cases and data gathered here. 
However, this thesis will not cover external conditions, but will focus on the unit level 
only. 
C. BACKGROUND 
SOF units are expected to perform a wide variety of missions under diverse 
conditions. They are considered a strategic tool, and as such, the price for failure is 
correspondingly high.  As stated in the 2008 NATO SOF Study, “SOF operates outside 
the realm of conventional operations or beyond the standard capabilities of conventional 
forces, thus providing a solution to extraordinary circumstances of political interest when 
                                                 
2  Jan Bloch, Future of War (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1903). 
3  Levels of command structure above the unit level range from directorate, through headquarters, to 
command. 
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no other option is available.”4 Examples of unsuccessful SOF operations where the 
reasons for failure could have been avoided are unfortunately numerous. Operation Eagle 
Claw or Operation Urgent Fury, where inappropriate assessment and planning resulted in 
unnecessary loss or mission failure, are examples of “learning the hard way.”5 Yet both 
examples, under the scrutiny of later investigations, revealed that the lessons learned had 
actually been learned before. As a strategic tool, SOF units operate beyond the standard 
capabilities of conventional forces, under extraordinary circumstances. To hone such 
tools by trial and error becomes expensive over time. In other words, there is increasing 
demand for quick adaptation as both the enemy and conditions change rabidly in 
contemporary conflicts. Under such conditions, the need for a SOF unit to learn quickly 
can hardly be overstated.  
Not all SOF units are created equal, and during their existence they go through 
different stages of development. There are vast differences amongst SOF units, including 
size and internal structure (i.e., number of teams, companies, and battalions).6 They have 
different placements within the command structure and vary in experience and amount 
and quality of equipment. Fundamentally, they differ in their primary purpose and 
national tasks. There are differences in selection procedures, recruitment pools, and 
personnel policies. Similarly, their performances vary over time. Some units are deployed 
more often than others, and consequently have more opportunities for gathering 
                                                 
4  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SOF Coordination Center, “The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Forces Study” (Mons: 2008), ii. 
5  Operation EAGLE CLAW, which took place in 1980, was an unsuccessful attempt to rescue 52 
American citizens held hostage in Iran. Due to its flawed planning and preparation, unreasonable 
operational security that prevented sharing information amongst the units that constituted the task force and 
limited rehearsals the operation resulted in eight dead and four U.S. soldiers injured while no hostages 
rescued. Follow-on investigation revealed the avoidable mistakes and recommended structural changes 
within U.S. SOF. Operation URGENT FURY in 1983 was primarily aimed at rescuing over six hundred 
American students held hostage by Marxist Revolutionary Military Council that overthrown the 
government of Grenada. Although the overall result was a success, in this operation the U.S. SOF suffered 
heavy losses mostly due to poor planning and coordination and gross intelligence failures. Further 
investigations also revealed poor communications and equipment failures. Susan L. Marquis, 
Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1997).  
6  The differences in internal structure are very frequent. The numbers of the members in the smallest 
element (team, platoon) range from four to 16. These numbers originated from units’ history, original 
purpose (i.e., original core missions), and are also influenced by the internal structure within services 
within which the unit originated. 
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experience. Others have had more time to send people to schools and courses. But as 
units grow in size and maturity, they are likely to become more bureaucratic 
(configurations suitable for environment ranging from stable simple environment to 
stable complex environment); thus they are likely to become more rigid and less flexible 
as they strive to maintain certainty in complex environments.7 As the environment of a 
unit grows in complexity, the amount of information coming to the unit grows, too. As a 
result, channels (and people) can become overloaded. Since reaction speed and degree of 
flexibility are the key traits of SOF units, in unstable and fluid environments a unit can 
become less flexible, less capable of learning, and consequently less effective from a 
long-term perspective.8 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis focuses on two primary questions to better understanding what 
facilitates organizational learning within SOF. The questions this thesis seeks to answer 
are: 
1. What are the internal and external conditions that facilitate rapid learning and 
flexible responses in a SOF unit? 
2. What internal processes in a SOF unit can be established to facilitate rapid and 
flexible responses to new information and situations? 
Drawing from a diverse range of subgroups within the SOF community, this 
thesis will provide insight into organizational learning and the similarities and differences 
among units. The goal is to improve understanding of the internal dynamics of 
organizational learning within the SOF community.  
                                                 
7  Thomas K. Adams mentions the structural problems in U.S. SOF in the late 80s, after the SOF grew 
in size. Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations in Action: the Challenge of Unconventional Warfare 
(London: Frank Cass, 1998), 204–206. 
8  Bureaucratic institutions are not suited for an unstable environment. Mintzberg mentions 
inadaptability as one of the weaknesses of bureaucracy. His notion is that bureaucracy is not a structure 
suitable for innovation, when there is a need to innovate he suggests a change of configuration.   Henry 
Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?" Harvard Business Review 59, no. 1 (1981): 7–9. 
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E. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The literature on SOF and the military as learning organizations is limited, 
primarily focused on learning infrastructure and the education of soldiers and military 
leaders. Because of this dearth, this thesis will synthesize military organizations with 
learning organizations developed in the business literature. When existing articles cite the 
U.S. Army as a learning organization, one needs to be sure how “organization” was 
defined.9 Otherwise, such a claim might be more wishful thinking and misperception of 
terms than an accurate representation of the current state of an organization.10 In other 
words, even when an organization perceives the need for organizational change towards 
becoming a learning organization, some of the conditions that facilitate organizational 
learning are hard for a large, bureaucratic organization to achieve. The easier changes 
have been already considered and quite successfully fielded. Examples of such successes 
are the extensive use of collaborative environments as learning infrastructure, or new 
approaches to military education that foster critical thinking and creativity.11 
F. FRAMEWORK 
The literature on organizational learning offers extensive insight into how non-
military and non-SOF organizations learn. While SOF units do have specific task 
environments, some of the practices of a learning organization still apply. 
The theoretical framework for this research builds on these practices and further 
particularizes the specifics of the SOF unit as a learning organization. While initial 
assessment of components suitable to SOF specifics may help to narrow the focus within 
                                                 
9  In their respective recent works, both Alvaro Gonzales and David Paroby & Darin White provide 
descriptions of current state of affairs within the U.S. Army from the organizational learning perspective, 
and state that current U.S. Army is a learning organization. Alvaro M. Gonzalez,  “The U.S. Army: A 
Learning Organization” (April 12, 2010): 12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588284. David 
Paroby and Darin White, "The Role of Shared Vision and Ethics in Building an Effective Learning 
Organization," Southern Journal of Business and Ethics 2, no. 19445474 (2010): 140.  
10  As a description of a military as a learning organization could serve Adam Harmon’s article describing 
the traits that have made Israeli Defense Forces a successful learning organization. For further reference, 
please see. Adam Harmon, “Living in a Democracy. Working in an Autocracy,” accessed September 09, 
2011, http://www.lonelysoldiermemoir.blogspot.com/.  
11  Richard Chilcoat, "The Revolution in Military Education." Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ no. 22 
(1999): 62–63. 
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organizational learning, further focused research should confirm or deny the presence and 
applicability of these components. In other words, the overall framework of this thesis is 
predicated upon a broad comparison of structural and procedural components in order to 
identify and isolate the elements that facilitate organizational learning for SOF units 
specifically. 
Certain procedures may be applied to aid successful organizational learning 
within a SOF unit. These enabling procedures allow the SOF unit to avoid learning traps.  
  
 
Figure 1.   Dynamics of learning organizations 
G. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will employ a cross-sectional comparison design through large-N 
survey research and critical-incident interviews. These two principal methods will strike 
the balance between quantitative and qualitative methods. The Department of Defense 
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Analysis (DA department) within the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
will be the primary location of data collection. NPS serves mainly American officers, but 
also international, NATO, and allied SOF students. The mission of the DA department 
“[is] to develop critical thinkers and capable operators, planners and commanders for the 
rigors of irregular warfare,” and the course of instruction is “specifically built around 
operational and strategic issues and the use of special operations forces.”12  Student 
diversity and the overall focus of the DA department make it an ideal starting point for 
the study of SOF as a learning organization. 13 
This thesis surveys students with SOF backgrounds and uses two methods to 
identify the degree of enabling structural and procedural components, together with the 
degree of successful organizational learning. These methods consist of cross-sectional 
analysis using survey research and critical-incident technique. 
A subset of the survey will be subjected to cross-sectional analysis to detect 
causal factors (both procedural and structural) and the presence and degree of dependent 
variables i.e., unit’s perceived degree of organizational learning. Additionally, the 
analysis will discover the degree to which a unit successfully negotiates obstacles to 
organizational learning. Critical-incident interviews will be used to gain additional 
insights that may not be readily available in the data gleaned from the survey. The 
qualitative nature of this method allows for broader and deeper insight into a problem and 
its context. The survey population will be DA students who are members of SOF from 
NATO or allied countries and are willing to participate. Surveys and interviews will 
provide additional insight into the best practices for successful unit learning. 
                                                 
12  “DA History,” Naval Postgraduate School, November 16, 2011, accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSOIS/Departments/DA/About_Us/DA_History.html. 
13  Student body of the Defense Analysis curriculum consists of joint SOF, conventional, and 
international students, where international students come from Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 
and IMET: International Military Education and Training program. “DA History,” Naval Postgraduate 
School, November 16, 2011, accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSOIS/Departments/DA/About_Us/DA_History.html. 
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Process tracing describes the chain of events that contributes to effective unit 
learning, as identified through surveys and interviews.14 This method will analyze 
effective methods of SOF-unit learning and determine how these methods were 
institutionalized at the unit level. Interview results will be used extensively to reconstruct 
the course of organizational learning. Additionally, a further focus will be on how these 
units were able to cope with learning disabilities and capability-learning traps and 
overcome organizational predispositions against organizational learning. This method 
will determine how to best facilitate organizational learning in SOF units. Since there is 
heterogeneity among the units, this comparison may offer insight into the interplay of 
pertinent elements. The presence of these elements in the unit will vary, as will the 
degree of success in organizational learning. 
 
 
                                                 
14  Stephen Van Evera, Guide to methods for students of political science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997),  64. 
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II. LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 
A. RELATION TO ORGANIZATIONS 
Organizational learning is one of several processes within an organization. As it 
relates to the acquisition of knowledge, it requires better understanding of both internal 
and external environments. In relation to definition of organizational learning used for 
this study, once knowledge is acquired there is a need to act upon it. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
In the long term, learning is of vital importance to any organization. Learning 
creates conditions for adaptation, innovation, competiveness, progress, superior 
performance, understanding, change, growth, expansion, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
understanding, focused both inwards and outwards. Without learning, an organization 
remains static and inert. 
Organizational learning is tied to long-term survival and success. Arie de Geus, a 
former manager working at Royal Dutch Shell, has noted that “a full one third of Fortune 
500 industrials listed in 1970 had vanished by 1983.”15 De Geus’s answer to the question 
“how does a company learn and adapt” offers insight into how hard it is and how few 
companies can actually do it. Survival for a company is an important matter. It is no less 
important for the military. The contrast between a corporation and a military organization 
becomes apparent in the price paid when learning is unsuccessful. When a military 
organization fails to learn, the price is extremely high. For a military organization, the 
need for organizational learning can hardly be overstated. 
C. OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Unlike the dearth of literature on military organizational learning, the non-
military literature is quite copious. One of the leaders in this field, Amy Edmondson, 
                                                 
15  Arie P. de Geus, "Planning as Learning," Harvard Business Review 66, no. 2 (1988): 70. 
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describes “[organizational] learning [as] a process of improving organizational action by 
developing better knowledge and understanding.”16 Her colleague at the Harvard 
Business School, David Garvin, defines a learning organization as “an organization 
skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior 
to reflect new knowledge and insights.”17 Achieving such organizational quality requires 
the adoption of certain practices. This thesis will use Garvin’s definition to assess how 
precepts from corporate learning organizations apply to SOF units. 
No universally agreed-upon theory of organizational learning exists. Thus, a 
conceptual synthesis is in order. The wide disagreement on the crux of organizational 
learning is suggested by the multiple definitions listed by David Garvin. In his book, 
Garvin presents seven recognized definitions given by organizational theorists writing in 
scholarly journals; he also notes that the differences in regard to the requirements for 
organizational learning go as far as considering the need for behavioral change versus a 
new way of thinking, or information processing versus shared insights into organizational 
routines.18 The missing universally agreed-upon theory creates space for multiple 
definitions, and those in turn create diverse perspectives on organizational learning itself. 
Thus, this thesis will use many of the elements expected to be present within a learning 
organization. 
There are broad categories of procedural and structural elements that enhance 
organizational learning. In other words, a learning organization can be expected to have 
incorporated certain structural and procedural elements that make learning inherent (and 
thus possible). 
1. How Do Organizations Learn? 
Organizations learn through teamwork. Depending on the context of learning, the 
teams can be organic, and their interdependence must be managed. 
                                                 
16  Amy C. Edmondson, "The Local and Variegated Nature of Learning in Organizations: A Group-
Level Perspective," Organization Science 13, no. 2 (2002): 128. 
17  David A. Garvin, "Building a Learning Organization," Business Credit 96, no. 1 (1994): 20. 
18  David A. Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 9–10. 
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Although many practices and procedures start at the individual level, 
organizational learning happens through team learning. As Senge writes, “Individuals 
learn all the time and yet there is no organizational learning. But if teams learn, they 
become a microcosm for learning throughout the organization.”19 According to 
Edmondson, learning in organizations happens on three levels: individual, team, and 
organizational. Individuals learn naturally. Teams do not learn naturally, but teams are 
the unit of learning in organizations and therefore need to be managed. Edmondson 
demonstrates that organizations learn through teams, whose interdependence must be 
managed.20 
Organizations tend to learn better in small teams.21 Since they do not always 
organize that way, learning might be a challenge. Team learning must be fostered by an 
organization’s leadership, since there is a need for managing team interdependence. The 
need for learning in teams is well manifested by Steve Kerr, as noted in Garvin’s book: 
[the] golden rule of organizational development is, “Never send a changed 
person back to an unchanged environment.”… Even if they got excited, 
they come back to a full desk and a boss who doesn’t understand their 
passion. Most of the time, no learning occurs, since we define learning as 
a change in behavior.22  
If a person goes away and, after returning, tries to bring new insight into the 
organization, he faces the challenge of lack of comprehension. Kerr continues with the 
experience of an opposite outcome if the learners showed up in teams, ideally 
representing a diagonal slice of the organization.23 The difference in team’s composition 
is driven by the context of learning and organization itself. However, the need for 
learning in teams composed of people from across the organization is widely 
                                                 
19  Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New 
York: Doubleday/Currency, 2006). 
20  Amy C. Edmondson, “Organizing to Learn: Module Notes for Instructors” (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2003), 20. 
21  While Edmondson argues, that organizations learn through teams, Hackman states the relation 
between the size of the team and its productivity. Peter Senge states team learning as one of the disciplines 
of organizational learning. 
22  Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 129. 
23  Ibid. 
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acknowledged. Such learning allows for diversity and supports sharing, openness, and 
dialogue, but is not always easy to accommodate. 
2. Is It that Easy? 
Creating a learning organization is not an easy task; there are many obstacles. 
Structurally, organizations created to execute orders are not well predisposed for 
learning.24 Strongly hierarchical and evaluation-based systems (such as the military) are 
not a good start for a learning organization either. These systems naturally prevent 
intelligent failure and psychological safety; a person is not likely to take calculated risks 
and experiment, or openly display ignorance if the system does not support such freedom 
or if he does not feel safe to take interpersonal risks. Promotion in the U.S. Army is 
carried out by established boards that rely on written reports. This promotion system has 
two major pitfalls. First, the board can only rely upon written reports that often 
undervalue innovative and experimental behavior. Second, the same board that evaluates 
conventional Army officers also selects Special Forces personnel for promotion. 
Consequently, the context of each personnel’s performance is not transmitted into 
promotion considerations. This board, examining both conventional and unconventional 
soldiers, promotes each according to the same qualities, which in turn promotes 
conventional behavior among SF personnel. 
Creating a learning organization is difficult to achieve in and of itself, and 
unfortunately there are other real obstacles beyond challenges to the establishment of new 
practices—there are also learning traps and disabilities, which are further covered in 
Chapter IV. A lack of balance between exploratory and exploitative learning increases 
                                                 
24  As Edmondson researched, many management systems are designed to facilitate reliable execution 
of established procedures. Amy C. Edmondson, “Organizing to Learn: Module Notes for Instructors,” 3. 
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the probability of an organization’s falling into a capability learning trap.25 Peter Senge 
mentions seven learning disabilities that are commonly present among organizations;26 
these obstacles are frequently present in SOF units. With the speed of career progression, 
military leadership rarely sees the consequences of its decisions.  This is especially true 
under the common practice of assigning an individual to a different part of the 
establishment before the results of his previous decisions are clear to him. Put differently, 
due to career progression, fewer feedback loops exist between leadership decisions and 
the experience of consequences. This pattern is often exacerbated by the frequency and 
pace of deployments as well. Because units are expected to prepare for the next event or 
deployment, their ability to learn organizationally is limited by a fixation on events. 
3. How to Solve the Challenge? 
For a military unit to become a learning organization, some traditional attributes 
need to be revised. Some degree of insight is offered by Adam Harmon, an American 
who served in the Israeli defense forces (IDF). Harmon describes how the internal culture 
of the IDF fosters innovation and how conditions for organizational learning are 
                                                 
25  Harrison and Boyle mention three learning traps. The distinctive competencies trap, where 
successful learning leads to an increasing focus on the particular competence learnt taking attention away 
from “other bases of experience and knowledge; The power trap, which occurs when firm becomes so 
dominant in its business sector that it can influence its environment, and typically loses its ability to 
develop capabilities to respond to changes in the environment; and the success trap which results from 
firms using exploitative learning to develop new capabilities, which may be inappropriate for the firm in a 
changed environment. Jeannette Harrison, and Emily Boyle, "Falling into Capability Learning Traps: The 
Role of the Firm's Predominant Managerial Mental Models," in Management Decision 44, no. 1 (2006): 32. 
26  Senge’s learning disabilities: “I’m [SIC?] my position (people mistaking their job with their 
identities, consequently they see their responsibilities limited to the boundaries of their position) little 
responsibility for overall results, lack of interoperability and interdependence, The enemy is out there (side 
product of I’m my position, due to the lack of appreciation of how our own actions extend beyond the 
boundary of that position), The illusion of taking charge (being proactive is often mistaken for being 
reactive in disguise, being proactive to consequences and to the the causes), The fixation on events (people 
are naturally focusing on short term events, and tend to miss the long term patterns of changes), The 
Parable of the boiling frog (similarly to frog in a water, if the change is fast it is easy to notice that and act 
accordingly, if the change happens gradually and slowly over time, people tend to miss the change until it 
is too late), The delusion to learn from experience (although the best learning is from direct experience, we 
never directly experience the consequences of many of our most important decisions (since the most critical 
decisions made in organizations have system wide consequences that stretch over years or decades), The 
myth of the management team (as Argyris noted, most management teams perform quite well with routine 
issues, but they break down under pressure).”   Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the 
Learning Organization, 18–25. 
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achieved.27  He argues that very low formality and parallel bottom-to-top decision 
making lead to a high level of trust between the senior leadership and lower-ranking 
members of the organization. In addition, Harmon argues that the culture of open 
communication and public accountability fosters the IDF’s ability to learn.28 
D. ACHIEVING ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
As mentioned earlier, a learning organization should have certain practices and 
structures in place to enable specific components of organizational learning. As each 
carries out only certain aspect of organizational learning, these components are 
complementary to each other. Also, as there is no single “silver bullet” among them, thus 
none of them should be perceived as more important than other, and their merit comes 
when they act in concert. For the purposes of further assessment and comparison, this 
thesis uses five procedural and five structural elements. 
1.  Procedural Elements 
Five procedural elements enhance organizational learning: 
a. Framing and Reframing 
Social theory recognizes a frame as a filter humans use to see and interpret 
events around them; such filters in turn influence what we see and how we interpret it. 
Amy Edmondson mentions, “Framing is neither bad nor good; it is simply inevitable,” 
which means it is always present.29 But she also notes that these “[sets] of assumptions  
 
                                                 
27  For more information, please see Adam Harmon, “Living in Democracy. Working in Autocracy,” 
Lonely Soldier: Memoir of an American in the Israeli Army, April 25, 2009, accessed September 21, 2011, 
http://www.lonelysoldiermemoir.blogspot.com/. 
28  Adam Harmon, “Living in Democracy. Working in Autocracy,” Lonely Soldier: Memoir of an 
American in the Israeli Army, April 25, 2009, accessed September 21, 2011, 
 29  Amy C. Edmondson, “Framing for Learning: Lessons in Successful Technology Implementation,” 
California Management Review 45, no. 2 (2003): 1.  
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and beliefs about a particular object or situation” have an impact on learning.30 As SOF 
units are expected to perform, they are likely to frame new situations as an opportunity to 
perform and “get it right.”31 Such focus on performance can actually hinder 
organizational learning. By contrast, when new situations are communicated as a 
challenge or opportunity to learn, the likely outcome of the situation differs considerably, 
and the focus shifts from “do it right” or “perform” to “let’s learn” or “let’s find out 
how.” Framing influences perceptions and in turn has an impact on the kinds of 
information gathered, evaluated, and shared. Gathering information is the first step in 
learning, while sharing information is part of step two.32 The nature and quality of the 
information gathered influences the possible outcome. 
In her study on implementing a new method of cardiac surgery, 
Edmondson elaborately compares the implementation of this new method among sixteen 
hospitals. She concludes that “differences in how the project was framed by each project 
leader gave rise to different attitudes about the technology and to striking differences in 
teamwork.”33 The differences in framing of the project’s purpose, the leader’s role, and 
the team’s role not only influenced success, but also caused differences in team 
dynamics, communication before, during, and after the procedure, and further innovation 
in this technique by one of the team.34 
b. Intelligent Failure 
Failure is an integral part of learning. While focusing on small successes 
builds reliability and brings short-term success, skillful planning for possible failures 
builds up resilience and supports viable long-term performance. According to Sim Sitkin, 
“failure enhances adaptation to changing environmental conditions and systemic 
                                                 
30  Edmondson, “Framing for Learning: Lessons in Successful Technology Implementation,” 1 and 17, 
notes. 
31  Ibid., 15. 
32  David Garvin mentions that virtually all studies are using three to four stages of learning; as Garvin 
himself uses three – these acquiring, interpreting, and applying. Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to 
Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 21–28.  
33  Edmondson, “Framing for Learning: Lessons in Successful Technology Implementation,” 44. 
34  Ibid., 44–48. 
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resilience to unknown future changes, both of which enhance long-term performance,” 
and Sitkin further states that “failure is an essential prerequisite for learning.”35 Similarly 
to framing mentioned before, SOF units are created and led to perform. As with the 
majority of other organizations, success is the key, and peacetime training and 
preparation is often as focused on success as during war. As SOF units are expected to be 
innovative and capable of fielding out-of-the-box solutions to become successful in a 
long term, they need to be able to make use of intelligent failure. 
However, as Sitkin puts it, success only fosters reliability and thus 
improves short-term performance, while failure improves resilience and thus improves 
long-term performance. Success is naturally more valued than failure, and it is easy for it 
to be overvalued, since it improves efficiency, supports shared goals and values, provides 
motivation and confidence to persist, and helps create conditions for operational stability 
and coordination. Thus, in the short term, success improves reliability and performance. 
However, among the liabilities of success belong restricted searching, reduced attention, 
complacency, risk-aversion, and homogeneity; and unlike the benefits of small failures, 
these liabilities limit resiliency. Small failures support resiliency by supporting deeper 
processing of information concerning potential problems. These failures leads to ease of 
recognition and interpretation of problems, increased searching for solutions, and 
heightened motivation to adapt, risk, practice, and welcome variety. It is safe to say an 
organization that focuses mostly on success will initially become more efficient and 
reliable in execution, but, in the long term, more limited in its outlook and agility, more 
risk-averse and homogenous, and more limited in innovating and learning. For a failure 





                                                 
35  Sim B. Sitkin, “Learning through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses,” in Research in 
Organizational Behavior, edited by Barry M. Staw and L.L. Cummings, 231–266. London: JAI press, 
1992, 232 & 260. 
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outcomes of modest scale, be executed and responded to quickly, and be located in 
domains that are familiar enough to allow for effective learning.36  
One example of intelligent failure that is well established within the 
internal culture and practice of an organization is the Palo Alto-based design company 
IDEO. Within this company, failing is not only a necessary step enroute to innovation 
and learning, it is regarded as a learning enhancer. Within their innovation methodology 
are two particular steps well-grounded in failing.37 During their brainstorm sessions,  
civility and praise are encouraged; interruptions and criticism are not. 
Designers are urged to treat the process as a game; the goal is to generate 
‘wild ideas’ and ‘defer judgment’ as long as possible. The result, 
according to careful anthropological study is, is that at IDEO “there is a 
little cost for suggesting a bad idea as long as a person occasionally comes 
up with a good one.”38  
Their next step, prototyping, makes great use of failure. 
The concept of “failing often in order to succeed sooner” permeates the 
methodology. Trying a ‘half-baked’ idea with users refines the idea to 
something truly usable. The point is to make many things on a small scale 
and to focus energy on the few ideas gaining momentum that have 
potential to make impact.39  
Within IDEO, “[brainstorming] is widespread, and physical prototypes are constantly 
generated, distributed, reviewed, and revised. David Kelley, the CEO, recently extended 
this approach to structural change. In 1995 and 1996, he introduced a number of 
organizational innovations, including working teams and a smaller ‘company within  
 
 
                                                 
36  Sim B. Sitkin, “Learning through Failure: The Strategy of Small Losses,” 243. 
37  The primary steps of the IDEO’s Innovation Methodology are: Research, Storytell, Brainstorm, 
Prototype, and Implement. Christi D. Zuber, Victor Alterescu, and Marylin P. Chow, “Fail Often To 
Succeed Sooner: Adventures in Innovation, The Permanente Journal 9, no.4 (Fall 2005): 46. 
38  Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 39. And 
Robert I. Sutton and Andrew Hargadon, “Brainstorming Groups in Context: Effectiveness in a Product 
Design Firm,” Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1996): 706. 
39  Christi D. Zuber, Victor Alterescu, and Marylin P. Chow, “Fail Often To Succeed Sooner: 
Adventures in Innovation, The Permanente Journal 9, no.4 (Fall 2005): 45. 
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company.’ Kelley urged employees to view these arrangements the same way that they 
treated physical prototypes: as ‘temporary and reversible experiments’ that could be 
refined and altered as needed.”40 
c. Balanced Exploration and Exploitation 
Both exploration and exploitation have their strong and weak sides. Long-
term adaptation requires a balance between both. A Stanford scholar focusing on 
organizational psychology, James March, notes that “adaptation requires a balance 
between exploration and exploitation but is continually threatened by the tendency of 
each to extinguish the other.”41 As these two approaches essentially compete, there are 
inherent risks hidden beneath. Successful adaptation needs a balance of both. Such 
balance needs to be applied to learning as well. As Harrison and Boyle conclude, a 
managerial mental model should be changed frequently, since “firms should maintain an 
appropriate balance between the exploitative and exploratory learning to prevent them 
from falling into capability learning traps.”42 These traps are discussed in Chapter IV. 
While exploitative learning focuses on improving previous knowledge, explorative 
learning is oriented towards gaining new knowledge. This notion of balance is similar to 
the previously noted intelligent failure. While learning through success is based on using 
and improving successfully used knowledge, exploratory learning is based on looking for 
new knowledge; this is achieved through exploratory learning, which, if well conducted, 
accepts intelligent failure as a possible outcome of experimentation.  
When the training and preparation of a SOF unit focuses on the 
improvement of skills, it is by nature exploitative learning. Seeking new approaches, new 
skills, and areas of expertise is exploration. Without a balance between the two, there is a 
limit to how far a unit can get. Without a balance in learning, the learning of the unit 
becomes limited.  
                                                 
40  Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 149. 
41  James G. March, “Continuity and Change in Theories of Organizational Action,” in Administrative 
Science Quarterly, no. 2 (1996): 286. 
42  Jeannette Harrison, and Emily Boyle, "Falling into Capability Learning Traps: The Role of the 
Firm's Predominant Managerial Mental Models," Management Decision 44, no. 1 (2006): 40. 
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d. Established Environment of Psychological Safety  
While Edmondson uses the term psychological safety “to capture the 
degree to which people perceive their work environment as conductive to taking [these] 
interpersonal risks,” she also argues that “creating conditions of psychological safety is 
essential to laying a foundation for effective learning in organizations.”43 In a 
bureaucratic organization, people are subject to formal evaluation. SOF units are no 
exception, as they are mostly bureaucratic in nature. As noted by Edmondson, formal 
evaluation, together with an individual’s concern about how he is seen by peers and 
subordinates, limits the environment of psychological safety.44 Consequently, unless unit 
leadership provides and promotes an environment where people feel safe to take 
interpersonal risks, learning within the organization may be harder to achieve. Providing 
psychological safety starts with the leadership itself. Unless a leader acknowledges his 
own imperfections, promotes curiosity, encourages a climate where it is safe to speak up 
and ask questions, or provides aids to learning such as an anonymous reporting system or 
culture where failure and mistakes are seen as natural byproducts en route to learning, 
unit members are not likely to take interpersonal risks. 
The Harvard study Children’s Hospitals and Clinics covers a major 
organizational change implemented by chief operating officer Julie Morath in a hospital 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The goal was to elevate patient safety. Based on the finding 
that 72 percent of medical errors were recurrent, one of the initiatives was to “create a 
culture that welcomed open and frank communication about safety issues.”45 To allow 
for learning from incidents that went largely untapped due to blame shifting or 
concealing information, Morath instigated multiple initiatives. She created forums where 
staff members could learn about the incidents and discuss safety issues while learning 
about current research in the field. She also “instituted a ‘blameless reporting’ system for 
                                                 
43  Amy C. Edmondson, "Managing the Risk of Learning: Psychological Safety in Work Teams," in 
International Handbook of Organizational Teamwork, edited by M. West (London: Blackwell, 2003), 5. 
44  Edmondson, "Managing the Risk of Learning: Psychological Safety in Work Teams," 4. 
45  Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, and Anita Tucker, “Children’s Hospital and Clinics 
(A),” Case 9-302-050 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2007), 6. 
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recording medical errors … and … created a common language that everyone could 
utilize to discuss accidents.”46 Morath also “established a new disclosure policy 
regarding how to communicate with parents about medical accidents.”47 These new 
measures created a supportive environment where employees shared information without 
fear of blame. Not only incidents, but also “near misses” got reported, and the new terms 
used in discussions about the medical accidents facilitated more open and fruitful 
discussion, and, in turn, learning. The new disclosure policy, which was feared due to the 
risk of increased lawsuits, turned out not only more beneficial for both parents and 
hospital, but also uncovered a very rich source of insights and experiences.  
For leaders, the hurdle in acknowledging personal limitations is related to 
a perceived threat to their status. Likewise, establishing the environment of psychological 
safety could be especially challenging within a bureaucratic organization full of Type A 
personalities, where the competition over career and promotion strongly relies on written 
evaluation. 
e. Managers’s Tasks 
Managers and leaders have a key role in organizational learning.48 Their 
tasks are mainly related to creating an environment of psychological safety, supporting 
learning in teams, managing team interdependence, framing and reframing situations, 
raising awareness of, and subsequently assuming, suitable mental models, and promoting 
and spreading a vision. Another task of the managers and leaders is also to be a role 
model and lead by example, for there are only limited ways to foster shared vision, which 
is one of the disciplines of organizational learning. Shared vision comes from personal 
vision; as such it is incrementally built on one’s own choice. As Peter Senge put it, 
                                                 
46  Edmondson, Roberto, and Tucker, “Children’s Hospital and Clinics (A),” 7. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Managers have an essential role: assisting with problem-solving efforts, providing support for 
workers who attempt to improve their work systems, and valuing them as motivated employees. By 
reframing workers’ perceptions of failures from sources of frustration to sources of learning, managers can 
engage employees in system improvement efforts that would otherwise not occur. Anita L. Tucker, and 
Amy C. Edmondson, "Why Hospitals Don't Learn from Failures: Organizational and Psychological 
Dynamics that Inhibit System Change," California Management Review 45, no. 2 (2003): 69. 
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“writing a vision statement can be a first step in building a shared vision but, alone, it 
rarely makes a vision come alive within an organization.”49 He continues, “[Leader’s] 
intent on building shared visions must be willing to continually share their personal 
visions. They must also be prepared to ask, ‘Will you follow me?’ This can be difficult. 
For a person who has been setting goals all through his career and simply announcing 
those, asking for support can feel very vulnerable.”50 For a vision to become shared, 
people need to be enrolled or committed to it, and this is based on choice. Visions that are 
simply presented to people get compliance at best. Because a shared vision “provides the 
focus and energy for learning,” it “is vital for the learning organization.”51 The 
management tasks related to organizational learning are numerous, and some of them are 
more challenging than others, including creating and selling a shared vision. 
Unless a SOF unit’s management fulfills these tasks appropriately, the unit 
inevitably becomes limited in its learning as an organization. 
2. Structural Elements 
Just as there are procedural elements that facilitate organizational learning, for the 
successful conduct of organizational learning, certain elements must be present within the 
structure. Five structural elements to facilitate organizational learning are presented 
below. 
a. Learning Teams: their Size and Mix  
Not all teams are equally well suited to team learning. Size is one of the 
variables influencing their throughput while conducting an intellective task. In his book 
on team performance, Hackman presents two ideas about a size of the team and how it 
influences performance: first, that smaller teams perform better, and second, that people 
                                                 
49  Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 199. 
50  Ibid., 200. 
51  Ibid., 192. 
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tend to overstaff their teams.52 Thus one of the structural elements that facilitate 
organizational learning is the size of the working team. According to Hackman, with a 
growing number of members, a team’s potential productivity grows at a decelerating rate, 
while process losses grow with an accelerating rate.53 As a general rule of thumb, 
Hackman noted that teams are likely to perform better if the number of the team members 
is actually a little bit lower that the task requires. Although, the size of the team obviously 
depends of the nature of the task, Hackman’s golden rule is no more than six members.54 
Another variable is the composition of the team. The notion of composition here covers 
both the degree of homogeneity and levels or divisions. For homogeneity, the right mix is 
between homogeneity and heterogeneity, where “members have a variety of talents and 
perspectives, yet are similar enough that they are able to communicate and coordinate 
with one another competently.”55 The idea of diagonal-slice teams describes learning 
team, where the tacit, experiential knowledge is shared and ideally covers a wide range of 
skills and perspectives.56  
An example of the importance of team size is the General Electric 
Corporation’s change-acceleration process (CAP), a program that is generally regarded as 
effective. When Jack Welch become CEO in 1981, he believed that the General Electric 
“was slow, stodgy, and plagued by bad habits: ‘parochialism, turf battles, status, 
“functionalitis,” and most important, the biggest sin of bureaucracy, the focus on itself 
and its inner workings.’”57  “Managers and employees were separated by a vast gulf; 
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teamwork was poor to nonexistent; and applied problem-solving skills were lacking.”58 
Changes initiated by Welch resulted in three categories of courses: programs for 
managers transitioning to distinct and critical ranks, focused workshops aimed at 
companywide initiatives, and broad-based improvement programs focused on producing 
fundamental changes in work practices and behaviors. For some of the course, teams 
bring their own real-life problems to solve, and these must fulfill certain criteria in order 
to qualify.59 “Typically, teams consist of eight to twelve people, who represent a diagonal 
slice of the organization … team members must have credibility within their 
organizations and must represent a variety of critical stakeholders.”60 The composition of 
each team is project dependent and each team has a coach to educate, facilitate, and 
arbitrate. Initially, these coaches were external to the company; later these roles were 
filled from the various divisions. Participants arrive with knowledge about the problems 
and expectations about the course. After three days, they leave with improved knowledge 
about themselves and a plan on how to implement changes. For GE, within four years 
after implementing this approach to learning, the benefits were extremely positive. 
SOF units have a better starting point for the employment of learning 
teams, because of the smaller size of their fundamental unit. Traditionally, SOF teams are 
smaller than their conventional counterparts; and the level of formality tends to be lower 
within SOF in general. However, since the size of the teams within SOF range from four 
to sixteen members, some teams could be restricted by their size. When it comes to 
learning, teams deserve more attention, not only for the size of the teams, but because 
their composition has a strong impact on outcomes. When creating learning teams, the 
effort needs to be focused on size and composition—neither too small nor too big—and 
ideally represent the right mix of personnel from an appropriate slice of the organization. 
                                                 
58  Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 125. 
59  These problems “must involve cultural and organizational dilemmas, must require work beyond the 
few days devoted to CAP classes, and must have a significant payoff for both the business and the 
corporation as a whole. Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 
128. 
60  Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, 129. 
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b. Managerial Mental Models   
The author of the book The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge, suggests that 
management’s mental models are always present, and an organization needs to be aware 
of them.61 Their importance is in the fact that they shape our perceptions of what we see, 
which in turn influences how we react.62 As managerial mental models shape 
perceptions, they in turn shape decisions as well. While mental models facilitate 
perceiving, translating, and understanding presence [the present?], they also allow for 
understanding the future. This is the nature of their importance for organizational 
learning.  
The problem with mental models is that they are assumptions, and unless 
acknowledged and treated as such, the perception of current reality can become skewed. 
The correct translation of the presence allows for preparation for the future. As Senge 
puts it, “[the] problems with mental models lie not in whether they are right or wrong—
by definition, all models are simplifications. The problems with mental models arise 
when they become implicit—when they exist below the level of our awareness.”63 The 
worst case is being unaware of one’s own models. When one is perceiving reality and 
making decisions based upon assumptions one is unaware of, inappropriate actions can 
be taken for reasons unaware. The next step, corrective action, is likely to address the 
wrong reasons. With implicit assumptions one is unaware of, the likelihood of 
misunderstanding changes to the environment is higher. Elaborating on the last notion, 
Senge explains that the ultimate aim is the ability to constantly challenge one’s 
assumptions, i.e., mental models, openly and truthfully. Such an approach prevents 
mental models from going “under the radar,” and becoming outdated. Ultimately they are 
all assumptions, but if properly executed, they allow to us to “unearth shortcomings in 
                                                 
61  Peter Senge is a senior lecturer form Massachusetts Institute of Technology, founding chair of 
Society for Organizational Learning, and he is considered the author of the notion of learning organization. 
Harvard Business Review  identified Senge’s book The Fifth Discipline as one of the seminal management 
books of the past 75 years. “Peter Senge and the Learning Organization,” the Encyclopedia of Informal 
Education, accessed May 17, 2012, http://www.infed.org/thinkers/senge.htm. 
62  Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 8–9. 
63  Ibid., 166. 
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our present ways of seeing the world.”64 They help to elevate awareness of one’s own 
models and improve one’s ability to negotiate with others. When mental models are 
approached appropriately, the learning that takes place is generative and not reactive; the 
organization can innovate and adapt for the future.65 With mental models, the aim is not 
convergence and alignment, per se, but rather opened and truthful discussion; what 
matters is dialogue. Since the organization is a system within a larger system, the ultimate 
aim is to shift from those mental models that emphasize events to those that recognize 
and work with patterns.66 Without management’s willingness to constantly challenge its 
mental models, the organization’s effort to learn and innovate ends up inherently limited. 
A successful demonstration of work with mental models and how they 
promote organizational learning is the example of Royal Dutch/Shell. In 1972, when 
Shell’s scenario planning group foresaw distinctive changes in their task environment, 
planners failed to convince the managers of the company. The reason for this failure was 
the strongly ingrained experience of Shell’s managers, which was contradictory to 
predicted changes; although based on experience, the managers’ view of the world was 
fundamentally obsolete. Senge notes that in order to allow their managers to understand 
the changes that were about to come, Shell’s “Group Planners developed a new set of 
scenarios in January and February, 1973, which forced the managers to identify all of the 
assumptions that had to be true in order for the managers’ ‘trouble-free’ future to occur. 
This revealed a set of assumptions only slightly more likely to come true than a fairy 
tale.”67 The planners’ next step was to present a new set of scenarios based on the 
mangers’ assumptions, which enabled them to initiate, based on their own mental models 
and gradually perceive how the world was changing. “Although many Shell managers 
remained skeptical, they took the new scenarios seriously because they began to see that 
                                                 
64  Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 24. 
65  Generative learning is a “style of learning that incorporates existing knowledge with new ideas 
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their present understandings were untenable. The exercise had begun to unfreeze 
managers’ mental models and incubate a new world view.”68 As a result, the company 
reacted to changes that came a year later differently from other major oil companies. 
“Shell’s managers responded differently because they interpreted their reality 
differently.”69 From the weakest corporation among the seven largest oil companies, 
within nine years, Shell became one of the two strongest; “certainly it and Exxon were in 
class by themselves.”70 By the early 1980s, management’s mental models became an 
important part of the planning process at Shell. 
Similarly, in the events preceding the 9/11 attacks, not all factors were 
unknown. There was certain degree of awareness of flight-school attendances, phone 
calls, and meetings, and some of the people were watched. However, most people “had a 
mental model of how an airplane hijacking was supposed to unfold. [They] also had a 
mental model of what a weapon of mass destruction was.”71 These models were based on 
previous events and not on what was possible in reality. 
c. Selection of Personnel 
Amy Edmondson argues that certain types of people are hired when the 
purpose of a team is to execute, and other types for the purpose of learning. She 
maintains that conformers and rule followers should be hired for execution, while 
problem-solvers and experimenters should be hired for learning.72 Conventional military 
culture puts a high value on rules and discipline. People are trained and brought up to 
follow and lead. Such a culture also tends to value and promote those who conform to it. 
This in turn means that experimenters and problem solvers may not be valued as much. 
Their number could be limited (in comparison with the number of followers and 
conformers). Both groups together constitute the pool from which SOF members are 
                                                 
68  Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 169. 
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72  Amy C. Edmondson, “Organizing to Learn: Module Notes for Instructors,” 4. 
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selected, and this notion of variety within personnel is applied equally to further 
promotion. The selection processes of SOF units, as well as promotion criteria, do differ. 
And although these criteria focus on flexibility, and ability to think and make decisions, 
they also focus on individual performance. Organizations that focus on performance tend 
to focus on improvements in execution. The distinction between the routine and 
innovation is a distinction between the first and second order of learning; while the 
former tends to focus on efficiency, the latter focuses on improving learning conditions; 
similarly “managers tend to employ a consistent approach or style, often organizing to 
execute (particularly when this is consistent with the organization’s culture) and miss 
opportunities to employ a learning approach, despite facing a novel challenge.”73 An 
example of a rather holistic approach to selection is found in the state of Israel. At the age 
of 17, all students are screened and both males and females are invited to participate in 
aptitude and psychological exams, interviews, and medical evaluation. For some of the 
units, only the top two percent can take part in the selection process.74 Further selection 
focuses on, among other things, improvisation, teamwork, social integration, and 
intelligence; uncertainty constitutes a significant part of most of the selection drills.75 The 
difference between Israel and most other countries is its access to all possible recruits 
rather than to a pool of volunteers.76 
One of the core questions Dan Senor and Saul Singer ask in their book 
Start-Up Nation is, “what makes Israeli entrepreneurs so innovative and go-ahead?” One 
of the pieces to this puzzle was identified as previous service in military units, precisely 
                                                 
73  Amy C. Edmondson, “Organizing to Learn: Module Notes for Instructors” (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2003), 3–4. First order learning and second order learning was noted by Chris 
Argyris and Donald A. Schön, and the difference between the two orders of learning is based on the change 
required. The first order learning aims at improvement based on set norm, while the second order learning 
is required when the alteration of the structure of the system is needed. Thus the first order learning 
produces small improvements, and the second order learning questions the system and offers more radical 
changes. Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978), 87.  
74  Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle (New York: 
Twelve, 2011), eBook, 69–72. 
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the kind of selection needed for service in each specific unit. Perhaps the pinnacle of both 
selection and training among the Israeli elite units is the Talpiot. The program started 
after the debacle of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which the Israeli recorded as “costly 
reminder that Israel must compensate for its small size and population by maintaining a 
qualitative and technological edge.”77 The way to achieve such an edge was 
communicated to the military in a simple idea: “take a handful of Israel’s most talented 
young people and give them the most intensive technology training that the universities 
and the military had to offer.”78  
After thirty years, the Israeli Talpiot selection program still continues in its 
original format. “Each year, the top [two] percent of Israeli high school students are 
asked to try out—two thousand students … of these only one in ten pass a battery of tests 
… these two hundred students are then run through two days of intensive personality and 
aptitude testing.”79 After enrolling in the program, the Talpiot cadets go through an 
accelerated university degree, where they study more in less time. During their training, 
the cadets “are instructed to operate on the edges of anarchy, or at least insubordination,” 
they are told not to ask for advice, but instructed “[seek] the answers on your own. Go to 
Google, Facebook or whatever you want and see what you can to find new ways to get 
out of that trouble, to win this war. [Your superiors] are very good, smart people, but they 
may be framed in the old world and old system.”80 The reason for such an attitude is to 
prevent the cadets from becoming influenced by old assumptions and frameworks and 
thus becoming less capable of coming up with new, innovative solutions. “They also go 
through basic training with the paratroopers... the ultimate goal… is to transform them 
into mission-oriented leaders and problem solvers… by handing them mission after 
mission, with minimal guidance… some are mundane… [others] are as complicated as 
penetrating a telecommunications network of a live terrorist cell. But more typical is 
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forcing the soldiers to find cross-disciplinary solutions to specific military problems.”81 
The same qualities required of IDF’s innovators proved successful for creating new 
companies. 
When an organization needs to learn, the selection processes should take 
into account the need for a specific type of person.  Otherwise, it might be the case that 
learning is limited before it actually starts. Also, lowering the standards of selection in 
pursuit of filling empty positions within an organization does not help the organization in 
the long term. 
d. Learning Infrastructure 
Gaining new insights, seeking possible solutions, and supporting the 
implementation of changes are some of the tasks a learning infrastructure can manage in 
support of learning and innovation within an organization. Amy Edmondson defines 
learning infrastructure one in which “small groups throughout the organizations focus on 
relevant issues and inform each other as needed,” where the undelaying conditions is 
psychological safety.82 A study about children’s hospitals and clinics from the Harvard 
Business School offers a more detailed description and multiple examples of a 
successfully functioning learning infrastructure.83 In order to take place, both learning 
and organizational changes need a vehicle that will facilitate and support such activity. A 
learning infrastructure, such as a cross-functional team, can do that. Composed of 
personnel concerned with outcome, such infrastructure can create and field a reporting 
and analyzing system, monitor the initiative’s process, adjust the depth of inquiry, 
evaluate processes with a focus on learning, assure that the complexity of a system is 
taken into account, suggest changes, and oversee the implementation of changes to help 
remove barriers created by administrative and support staff. Such a learning infrastructure 
is both a method of communication and vehicle for change.84 Within a mature 
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organization with long-term, established processes, this infrastructure can build on 
gradual successes and support smoother transitions towards a learning organization. 
Beginning with a deep interest in improvements to patient safety, chief 
operations officer Julie Morath took several steps to learn about the issue, raise awareness 
of it, and finally introduce organizational changes in support of her goal. During the 
process, she created multiple structures: these were a patient-safety steering committee 
(PSSC), focused event studies (FES), and safety action teams (SAT). The PSSC started 
with ten members and eventually grew up to nineteen. It was headed by Morath and 
oversaw the safety patient initiative.85 The FES overlooked the hospital’s policy on 
conducting inquiries. One of the products of FES was the resolution to study not only 
serious incidents, but also the less serious, or “near misses.”86 Such a structure was 
crucial for understanding the causes hidden by systemic complexity. It also allowed less 
formal discussions and searched for ways to improve its work, e.g., experimenting with 
two facilitators, one for leading the discussion and the other to observe the nonverbal 
behavior of participants. The SATs were an example of a grassroots initiative, started by 
a nurse. Both the origin (structural location) of members and their combined experience 
were essential to the effort of adjusting practices so as to “to root out unnecessary 
complexity and to remove barriers that prevented them from providing effective care to 
patients.”87 
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Learning infrastructure that is created within a SOF unit with the 
commander’s endorsement, employing participants from across all levels and different 
parts of the unit, can gradually raise awareness, adjust internal procedures, and advise on 
possible changes to systems and processes. For a SOF unit, unless innovation is handled 
by small working teams and supported by leadership, its chance of success while trying 
to shift towards a learning organization are low. Such a unit can learn and improve, but 
the degree of learning and change will mostly be limited, local, and short term. 
e. Organized to Learn vs. Organized to Execute 
For a SOF unit to be successful in the short term, it must organize to 
perform, that is, to execute missions. Long-term success is enabled by organizing to 
learn, by balancing and employing both approaches appropriately. Which preference is 
taken into account profoundly influences the multiple traits and approaches to traits in an 
organization. Understanding the implicit differences between organizing to learn and 
organizing to execute raises awareness and makes fielding solutions easier. 
The “execution-based” hiring preference has been already mentioned in 
relation to the selection of personnel. Other differences can be observed in training, 
performance measurement, employee motivation, the meaning of empowerment, internal 
service goals, and internal structures. Conducting training before and during an 
assignment is another difference. When an organization focuses on execution, training 
takes place before, rather than during, the assignment. However, many insights and 
experiences surface and can be gathered during an assignments—more than those that 
can be gathered before. Consequently, degrees of learning opportunities are lost. 
Conducting after-action reviews and collecting lessons learned are not equal to explicit 
learning. Interconnected to training are performance measurements. The two questions—
”did you do it right?” and “did we learn?” produce very different answers. The first one 
represents the “to execute” approach and the second, “to learn.” Similarly, with these 
approaches, employees are motivated to do a repeated task well, or try new things to see 
what happens. These two are fine examples of exploitative and exploratory learning—
examples of short term and long-term focus. Other examples of differences between 
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exploitative and exploratory learning are in work structure—where execution-focused 
organization separates expertise and the learning-focused organization integrates it—and 
process goals, where execution-focused organization tends to drive out variance and 
learning-focused organization utilizes variance to enhance and improve.88  
Over a ten-year period, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration organized itself to take two distinct approaches to operations: one was to 
learn, and the other to execute. The two approaches surfaced during two events that could 
both have ended in disaster, though only one of them did. These events were the Apollo 
13 mission in 1970 and the 2003 Columbia mission. “[When] Apollo 13 was two days 
into its mission, travelling two thousand miles per hour, one of its primary oxygen tanks 
exploded.”89 The prognosis was not good, and worsening updates were giving less and 
less time for finding a solution. The flight director ordered the astronauts to lock 
themselves into a small lunar-excursion module and directed his teams at NASA to 
separate into different rooms with the task of finding a solution. The task was, as flight 
director Kranz put it “to stretch previous resources, barely for two men for two days, to 
support three men for four days.”90 
Looking for teamwork solutions to unanticipated emergencies had been 
rehearsed during preparation for the Apollo 13 flight. After three days, the awaited 
solution was found. The Columbia story is very different; during takeoff, a loose piece of 
foam hit the wing, and as a result, the space shuttle exploded, over two weeks after this 
incident happened.91 Although engineers brought the foam issue to the attention of 
managers many times, they were always told that “the foam ‘issue’ was nothing new—
foam dislodgements had damaged shuttles in previous launches and there had never been 
an accident.”92 Attempts by engineers to talk the managers into sending astronauts out 
and to check the surface of the shuttle failed as well. In an Harvard Business School  
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study, the authors explain the difference between the organizations of an experimental 
model and of a standardized model; the differences between NASA in the Apollo 13 and 
Columbia time periods.93  
Organizations based on a standardized model value routine, standards, and 
compliance. Followers are more valued than problem solvers, and exploitation is more 
valued than exploration. Among individuals, advocacy is more valued than inquiry. 
Although an interesting direction would be to take a closer look at how an initially 
exploratory organization makes its way towards a standardized one, the point here is to 
examine the difference between organizing to learn and organizing to execute.94 The 
obvious principal task of a SOF unit is to perform its mission. Overly execution-focused 
organization can still learn and improve, but the limitations imposed by the way it is 
organized will support exploitative learning, at best. For success in the long term, the unit 
needs to establish a balance between the compulsion to be effective in executing and the 
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III. EFFECTIVE LEARNING (CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT) 
Creating a learning organization is not an easy task. For thinking about 
organizational changes aimed at creating a learning organization, the McKinsey 7S model 
is useful tool. The McKinsey 7S model was developed in the early 80s and is one of the 
few models that have stood the test of time. This model assumes that for an organization 
to be successful, seven internal components need to align and be mutually reinforcing.95 
This model can serve multiple purposes, such as improving company performance, 
forecasting the likely effects of changes, aligning departments and processes during a 
merger or acquisition, and determining the best way of implementing future strategy.96  
 
Figure 2.   McKinsey 7S model 
There are seven elements within the model, and all must be considered when an 
organization contemplates change.  
 Strategy: the plan devised to maintain and build competitive 
advantage over the competition 
 Structure: the way the organization is structured and who reports 
to whom 
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 Shared values: called “superordinate goals” when the model was 
first developed, these core values are manifested in the corporate 
culture and the general work ethic. 
 Style: the style of leadership adopted 
 Staff: employees and their general capabilities 
 Skills: the actual skills and competencies of the employees 
working for the company97 
Any change towards creating an effective learning organization must take into 
account these seven elements. Employing these elements yields a clearer insight into the 
conditions and practices within an organization. 
A. CONDITIONS ENABLING EFFECTIVE LEARNING (“WHAT”) 
1. Strategy 
For effective organizational learning, a long-term strategy addressing 
organizational learning and innovation must be in place. The strategy is must focus not 
solely on measuring productiveness, but include scientific measurement of organizational 
learning as well.98 Such a strategy seeks to balance short-term improvement and long-
term innovation. Looking both outside and inside the organization to gain new insights 
and information is integral to the strategy. Part of this research is focused on 
environment; information gained is used to assess the environment to make sense of it. 
The outcomes are mental models that are shared by leadership, to be used when crafting 
current strategy. In other words, a strategy is based on current and relevant mental models 
shared by leadership. 
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2. Structure 
The structure of a learning organization is flat, and there is a considerable degree 
of flexibility within it. A good structure supports the creation of temporary teams and 
allows for communication. The number of boundaries among structural components is 
significantly low.99 Even when a structure has a degree of hierarchy, it is not overly 
adhered to, but rather, supports the strategy and tasks performed or is abandoned if it 
impedes learning.100 A good structure supports horizontal, vertical, and diagonal 
communication and allows for mutual adjustment when appropriate.101 Reporting is 
based on assignments and not solely on hierarchical and traditional top-down channels. A 
knowledge base, shared and maintained, is part of the structure. 
3. Systems 
Daily activities in a learning organization include executing and learning within a 
continuously maintained and contextually dependent balance. Daily activities walk the 
balance between exploiting experience, seeking efficiency, and doing known tasks better, 
versus exploration, questioning and reassessing old tasks, and looking for new tasks, 
solutions, and approaches. Performance is measured according to learning as well as to 
execution. Within daily tasks, there is a time allocated for reflection and analysis.102 
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4. Shared Values 
According to Gareth Morgan, shared values are based, on a “culture that promotes 
sharing ideas, openly discussing problems, questioning assumed consensus, and raising 
conscious awareness.”103 This culture is preferred over one that values meeting deadlines 
and sticking to schedule.104 Constant questioning is valued more than advocating one’s 
ideas. Collaborative work is valued over the achievements of individuals. Open dialogue 
and discussion are the norm.105 
5. Style 
Leaders’ decision-making style includes sharing their knowledge of their own 
strengths and weaknesses.106 Decisions are reached not by individuals in leadership 
positions, but rather by collaboration between leaders and employees. Instead of 
pretending to be perfect, leaders embrace their weak sides and balance them within the 
team.107 Thus they create a holistically achieved result, and an environment of 
psychological safety at the same time. Leaders are not directing so much as coaching and 
making conditions conducive to learning and executing. They communicate not in order 
to pass the message, but to create shared understanding, promoting inquiry over 
advocacy. 
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6. Staff 
Employees in a learning organization are not controlled, but empowered.108 Thus 
they do not feel directed, but instead they know they are part of an overall effort. 
Mistakes are not held against the individual, but are perceived as a part of learning.109 
Knowledge is power.110 People are hired based on diversity of their skills, and ability to 
learn. Instead of being expected to perform the job, employees are expected to learn. The 
hiring priority is for problem seekers and solvers over followers. 
7. Skills 
In a learning organization, prevailing skills are more related to generative learning 
than adaptive learning.111 Employees are trained in problem solving, consensus reaching, 
and analyzing data.112 They understand and employ dialogue and discussion.113 
Innovation and inquiry prevail over routine and advocacy. 
B. PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE LEARNING (“HOW”) 
1. Strategy 
For employees to become committed to their organization’s strategy, managers 
need to create a strategy based on collaborative effort. In communicating, managers need 
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112  Garvin, "Building a Learning Organization."  21–22. 
113  Senge, The Fifth Discipline: the Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 220. 
 42
to explain and show the reasons behind the strategy chosen. If the managers want 
employees to get committed, they must let each employee choose to do so, because 
strategy is based on vision, and vision is hard to impose on somebody.114 When forced, it 
can only secure compliance, which is far from enrollment or commitment.115 Because of 
this, managers need to create a strategy as part of a collaborative effort and communicate 
it as such. While creating and assessing the strategy, managers need to base their work on 
current mental models and must regularly assess and question these models in a 
collaborative fashion to ensure employee support and a shared vision for the future. 
2. Structure 
Managers need to introduce a considerable degree of flexibility into a structure, 
and then exercise that flexibility. A structure is conceived, approached, and assessed by 
managers as a framework that exists to support the organization’s aims, not something 
that needs to be rigidly held on to. In creating and adjusting structure, managers need to 
be creating and adjusting conditions favorable to the creation of temporary teams, which 
will be either diagonal-slice, natural, or peer oriented. As part of the structure, managers 
should support the creation of forums, databases, and other tools for retaining knowledge. 
3. Systems 
When measuring performance, managers need to focus on employee learning as 
well as execution, and this priority must be communicated to employees. Meetings are 
not mainly places for passing on commands or advocating views, but for open inquiry 
and sharing insights. Managers need to openly discuss the need for reflection and create 
an open environment. 
4. Shared Values 
When promoting shared values, managers should refrain from dictating a distant 
and unfamiliar list of core values created by themselves or somebody else. Rather, they 
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need to communicate their values by personal contact and example. They base their 
communication on explanation of the reasons behind shared values, and immerse in 
inquiry over the presence of its different constituents. Through open discussion and 
inquiry, employees are more likely to embrace shared values and become enrolled and 
even committed. 
5. Style 
Leaders need to practice a leadership style in line with their vision for the future 
of the organization, and, with a skillful blend of communication, promotion, and inquiry, 
create an environment of collaboration. In this environment, employees become 
empowered without the danger of fragmentation and dissolved power. Leaders create and 
support an environment of psychological safety and openly display their weaknesses, 
demonstrating that it is fine to acknowledge one’s limitations and that the purpose of the 
environment is to meet, collaborate, mutually supplement each other, and, most 
importantly, learn. 
6. Staff 
When selecting new employees, candidates should be assessed not only on their 
ability to carry out certain tasks, but on a wider range of skills, including communication, 
social skills, and collaboration. New staffs are hired based on an expectation to learning, 
not of knowing it all and being prepared to execute tasks. Individuals are expected to 
learn constantly. Managers plan and create conditions for education, training, retraining, 
learning, and reflection. The external task environment is not allowed to drive the 
rotation of personnel through positions; managers need to carefully plan for rotation and 





Certain everyday leadership skills must be exercised continuously by the 
organization’s leaders. Managers create conditions for learning, practicing decision 
making, collaborating, and exercising interpersonal skills.116 The distinctive skill among 
employees is generative learning.117 
C. MEASURING LEARNING 
1. Need for a Measurement 
Managers need to measure both performance and learning, and scientific methods 
must be utilized to this end. Otherwise, as Garvin put it, “the organization will remain a 
prisoner of ‘gut fact’ and sloppy reasoning, and learning will be stifled.”118 Managers 
have long faced the challenge of measuring organizational learning. Learning curves and 
experience curves are still widely used,119 but the weakness of these measures is that they 
focus on “a single measure of output.”120 Hence they are not very useful for 
measurements within mature organizations. 
2. Successful Practices 
One useful measure of learning is the “half-life” curve, which measures the time it 
takes to improve 50 percent in any specified performance measure.121 This flexibility of 
this measurement makes it applicable in a wide variety of uses, but its weakness is that it 
focuses on outputs. Garvin suggests that in measuring improvements in organizational 
learning, one must consider measuring all three stages of change: cognitive, behavioral, 
                                                 
116  Garvin, "Building a Learning Organization,"  21. 
117  Ajay Agarval, Learning Organization, HR Folks, 8, accessed June 6, 2012. 
http://www.hrfolks.com/articles/learning%20organization/learning%20organization.pdf 
118  Garvin, "Building a Learning Organization," 21. 
119  Ibid., 26. 
120  Ibid. 
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and performance.122 He asserts that for measuring cognitive changes, surveys and 
questionnaires may be used; for behavioral changes only direct observation helps; and for 
performance measures, half-life is useful. 
D. WHERE TO START 
Creating a learning organization, or building an entirely new one, is not easy. 
However, certain steps at the beginning will provide a solid start and help in the future. 
To create a supportive environment is a must. To cultivate an environment of safety, 
promote enquiry, and foster open dialogue and discussion is a good start. Flattening an 
organization to some degree, with fewer boundaries, will pay in the future as well. 
Knowledge retention, decision making, and collaborative tools will set the stage for the 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Obstacles that prevent organizations from learning are well known. Many 
scholars have dedicated substantial portions of their writings to factors that have a 
negative impact on an organization’s ability to learn. Two prominent authors on 
organizational learning, Peter Senge and David Garvin, refer to these obstacles as 
“learning disabilities.” Where Senge and Garvin differ is on what constitutes these 
disabilities. While Senge lists seven learning disabilities that are related to or cause 
limited understanding of the events taking place within an organization, Garvin structures 
his analysis around three stages of organizational learning.123 Another set of obstacles to 
organizational learning was introduced by Jeannette Harrison and Emily Boyle, who use 
the term “learning traps.” 
A. LEARNING DISABILITIES ACCORDING TO PETER SENGE 
Peter Senge’s book on organizational learning, The Fifth Discipline, contains a 
section dedicated to learning disabilities.124 Senge states that the findings of multiple 
studies show that half of all firms disappear before reaching forty years of existence.125 
He notes this happens regardless if: 
there is abundant evidence in advance that the firm is in trouble. This 
evidence goes unheeded, however, even when individual managers are 
aware of it. The organization as a whole cannot recognize impeding 
threats, understand the implications of these threats, or come up with 
alternatives.126  
Senge believes that the high mortality of companies is a direct consequence of their 
inability to learn.127 Moreover, this inability to learn, i.e. various learning disabilities, is a 
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product of the way companies are designed and managed, how jobs are described, as well 
as of the way people are conditioned to think and interact.128 Senge’s learning disabilities 
are: 
I AM IN MY POSITION 
The first learning disability is caused by confusing one’s job with one’s identity. 
When a person identifies with a set of tasks and not the purpose of the larger 
organization, he is limiting his outlook as far as responsibilities go. Such a person is 
working inside the bubble of one single position. He does not look outside, and is not 
aware of the consequences of his actions and decisions. 
THE ENEMY IS OUT THERE 
In essence, the second disability is blaming somebody else, and is connected to I 
am in my position. Since the person is missing the surrounding environment, he can 
hardly understand how his actions spread beyond the boundary of his position. And when 
those actions have consequences that hurt somebody, the common reaction is to blame 
somebody else. Under the influence of this disability, a person tends to apply a solution 
based on wrong assumptions. 
THE ILLUSION OF TAKING CHARGE 
The third disability describes the illusion of proactiveness. Being proactive is the 
right approach, but unfortunately, proactiveness is often only reactiveness in disguise.  
“True proactiveness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own problems.”129 
THE FIXATION ON EVENTS 
The fourth disability is caused by focusing on events instead of patterns. 
Individuals tend to focus on events. Within an organization, there is a tendency to focus 
on events. Consequently, conversations are dominated by concern about events, and that  
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leads to events-based explanations. Explanations based on events may be correct 
sometimes, but they prevent understanding once the problems involve longer-term 
changes.  
THE PARABLE OF THE BOILED FROG 
The fifth disability is limited adaptation to a gradually building threat. The 
parable of the boiling frog is used to illustrate that slow, gradual change may be much 
more challenging to perceive than immediate changes. The frog put in cool water feels 
comfortable, and if the temperature is slowly elevated, it does not sense the growing 
danger, but becomes groggier, and, in the end, dies in boiling water. To see the slower 
processes requires slowing down our own pace and paying attention to gradual changes 
as well as sudden ones. 
THE DELUSION OF LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 
The sixth disability takes place when one expects to learn from experience. 
Unfortunately, the consequences of one’s decisions could be of a long-term nature, and 
thus not directly observable. The fact that the best learning takes place from direct 
experience is well known, however “what happens when we can no longer observe the 
consequences of our actions?”130 The dilemma cited by Senge is that our most important 
decisions are usually related to a long-term perspective, and it is often impossible to 
experience their consequences. This is especially observable in an organization where a 
person stays in one position for only a short period of time (i.e., two years) and, on top of 
that, experiences a deployment for six to nine months. Under these conditions, to emplace 
any significant decision with system-wide consequences and observe its implications in 
either the home unit or arena of deployment becomes difficult. Once such a decision 
begins to have an impact on other divisions, the difficulty only gets compounded. 
“THE MYTH OF MANAGEMENT TEAM” 
Chris Argyris, an expert on learning within management teams, argues that “the 
[management] team may function quite well with routine issues. But when they confront 
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complex issues that may be embarrassing or threatening, the ‘teamness’ seems to go to 
pot.”131 Senge confirms this barrier and uses the example of enforcing this shortcoming 
in organizations by “rewarding the people who excel in advocating their views, not 
[those] inquiring into complex issues.” 
B.  LEARNING DISABILITIES BY GARVIN 
An alternative set of obstacles to organizational learning has been formulated by 
David Garvin.132 
Garvin sees organizational learning in three stages: acquiring, interpreting, and 
applying. His categories of learning disabilities follow these learning categories as well. 
Garvin’s learning disabilities are “common and often unavoidable by-product of the way 
people think and act,”133 and they can arise during any of the three stages of learning. 
The three primary disabilities that impede the acquisition of new information are 
blind spots, filtering, and lack of information sharing. 
Blind spots happen when the searching is either limited or pointed in the wrong 
direction. For the military, a chronic blind spot is the belief that the enemy will fight the 
same way he did in the last war, or that the enemy will be the same as he was last time. In 
a sense, this is the case of underestimating the enemy’s ability to innovate and evolve.134 
Another instance of disability is filtering. “Psychologists found that exposing 
supporters and opponents of capital punishment to identical evidence led them to 
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diametrically opposed conclusions.”135 Based on one’s previous experience, a person 
tends to ignore or leave out the data that does not resonate with his set of data.136 
Lack of information sharing only makes the other disabilities worse. Information 
deposited so that other parts of an organization cannot use it equals information not had; 
and such practice is not uncommon at all. “Information hoarding is a fact of 
organizational life, especially in political settings or where information is highly 
valued.”137 Problems in intelligence sharing among U.S. agencies before 9/11 are well 
known, and resulted in organizational changes. However, the multiple levels of the 
“Releasable To” classification of information, commonly used in combined operations in 
Afghanistan, is an equally good example.138 
Regardless of the quality of information acquisition, before any information gets 
applied, it needs to be accurately interpreted. David Garvin mentions many possible 
interpretative mistakes: 
 illusory correlation: viewing events as related simply because they 
appeared together 
 illusory causation: ascribing causality to events that occur in 
sequence and seem to be linked 
 the illusion of validity: increasing confidence in one’s judgment, 
especially with larger and larger amounts of information, even 
though the accuracy of judgment remains unchanged 
 framing effects: different responses to identical, uncertain payoffs 
that have been framed as potential gains rather than potential losses 
 categorical bias: the use and persistence of stereotypical categories 
for classifying people and events, even when faced with conflicting 
information 
 availability bias: assessing the probability of events by the ease 
with which examples come to mind, rather than their actual 
frequencies or likelihoods 
 regression artifacts: ascribing causality to actions that change a 
variable from an extreme (high or low) level to an average level, 
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even though the change is really due to chance (i.e., the greater 
likelihood that an average score will be obtained rather than an 
extreme value)  
 hindsight bias: the systematic biasing of probability estimates 
toward actual outcomes.139 
Of the biases above, some current examples might be the “well-established” connection 
between the surge of coalition forces in Iraq and the improvement of the security 
situation. While the credit really belongs to other factors, the case has been made that the 
improvement was caused by the increased number of coalition forces. This is illusory 
causation. The event is correlated, but has no causality towards the result.140 
Three disabilities related to the “applying” stage of learning are mentioned by 
Garvin: passivity, risk aversion, and lack of self-awareness.141 While passivity and risk 
aversion are well known, lack of self-awareness was best described by Chris Argyris in 
noting the inconsistency between how people say they will act and what they actually end 
up doing. In his book Action Science he states that “[the] distinction is not between theory 
and action but between two different theories of action: those that people espouse, and 
those that they use.”142 Such lack of awareness prevents learning, since ignorance of this 
discrepancy does not allow admitting the need for learning in the first place. 
C. CAPABILITY LEARNING TRAPS BY HARRISON AND BOYLE 
Another set of obstacles to organizational learning is caused by lack of balance 
between exploratory and exploitative learning. When exploitative learning prevails, a 
firm is likely to fall into one of the three capability learning traps involving distinctive 
competencies, power, and success.143 
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The need for balance between the two types of experiential learning (the 
exploratory and exploitative) was discussed by Levinthal and Marsch.144 Their work was 
built upon by Harrison and Boyle, who identified one of the reasons for imbalance in the 
managerial mental model. 
If a firm would be successful, it needs a distinctive capability; such capabilities 
are “rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable” … “bundles of complementary resources such 
as tacit knowledge, administrative skills, routines and physical assets with the flexibility 
to generate adaptive and valuable outputs.”145  In other words, for success, a firm needs a 
unique and non-replicable ability that secures success over its competitors. Especially 
advantageous are asymmetrical abilities—those that cannot be copied by other 
competitors.146 
Distinctive capabilities are obtained through experiential learning, which can be 
either exploratory or exploitative.147 While exploratory learning seeks to gain new 
knowledge, exploitative learning builds upon previous knowledge and improves it. There 
are two reasons it is typically easy for a firm to focus on exploitative learning. “First, it is 
difficult for firms to know when to begin learning new capabilities based on exploratory 
learning, and second, firms often do not know what new capabilities to learn.”148 The 
reason for it is that “by the time knowledge is needed it is too late to gain it; before 
knowledge is needed it is hard to specify precisely what knowledge might be required or 
useful.”149  
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If an organization focuses predominantly on exploitative learning, it is likely to 
fall into the distinctive competencies, power, or success trap.150 The distinctive 
competencies trap is based on the fact that, once a competency becomes successful, the 
tendency is to focus on the distinctive competency and further enhance it, taking away 
from “other bases of experience and knowledge,” distracting the company from paying 
attention to other aspects of its development and making it “more vulnerable to change in 
their environment.”151 Unfortunately, a company often loses its ability to adjust to its 
environment as well. “The power trap occurs when a firm becomes so dominant in its 
business sector that it can influence its environment.”152 Last is the success trap, 
occurring when a firm learns primarily through exploitative learning and the results 
consequently do not fit with a changed environment. Imbalance is not the only reason for 
falling into these capability-learning traps, as Harrison and Boyle’s case study shows; 
managerial mental models can be another. In their study of a British company, 
management focused its main effort on being as efficient as possible and failed to 
innovate in a way that competitors could not replicate. After some initial successes, they 
eventually lost their ability to field trendy products and increasingly lost their market. 
One of the ways to evade these traps is to maintain a balance between exploratory 
and exploitative learning, which is tied to a change of predominant managerial mental 
models.153 Many authors find scenario planning to be an appropriate tool for this 
purpose.154 Reasonable justification is offered by Brenneman et al., where, through 
scenario planning, managers “constantly rehearse possible pathways into the future” and 
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build “sets of mental models through which [the] managers enrich the corporate one.”155 
Consequently, managers can “rethink their world view” and take into account “the 
changing business environment more intimately.”156 As a result, they are better 
conditioned for assessing new directions. 
A striking example of the distinctive-competency trap is the change of world 
order after the Iron Curtain fell and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. Regardless of the number 
of irregular conflicts around the world in the last 60 years, the U.S. military has not 
significantly adjusted its approach. It took another 17 years to react to the insurgencies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and it was not until 2006 that the new FM 3-24, 
“Counterinsurgency,” was finally published.157 
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: THE SOF PERSPECTIVE 
Certain organizational characteristics are common to all military units, including 
special-operations forces. Better understanding of these characteristics and their influence 
on organizational learning within a SOF may be attained by examining the general 
differences between the large, conventional military and a SOF. This discussion can yield 
insight into a given organization’s predisposition to becoming a learning organization. 
A. MILITARY AND SOF PERSPECTIVE 
1. Strategy 
a. Military 
A traditional military organization exhibits a top-down approach. A 
conventional military is bureaucratic, strongly hierarchical, and “tall,” meaning many 
layered. These characteristics force a slow response to required changes and are tolerant 
to reaction against innovation and organizational adjustments. Typically, inputs from 
experience are incorporated in a tardy manner. The notion of future strategy is summed 
up by the widely known saying that the military always prepares for the last war. As 
plans for the future are often dominated by plans to acquire newer and better equipment, 





b.  SOF 
Due to the nature of some of their tasks, SOFs are more active in 
peacetime. As such, a SOF tends to be forward looking.158 With SOF being part of the 
larger services, the implications for the future may not be implemented fully. Also, when 
a SOF is unduly influenced by the larger military, i.e., becomes conventionalized; it 
naturally becomes less proactive and more reactive. Both the smaller size of SOF units 
and elements within the SOF culture tend to support a bottom-up approach, with more 
input from the lower echelons communicated upwards. As higher leadership drives the 
plans for the future, a SOF’s forward-looking, more bottom-up exchange of information, 
and the strategic utility of SOF units allow for strategizing that is more focused on the 
future than is common among the conventional military. For a SOF, in order to capitalize 
on its predisposition towards greater openness, a learning map would be a convenient 
tool.159SOFs are located relatively high within the organizational structure of the 
military, which supports their ability to be agile in devising future strategies. Smaller and 
higher placed units, i.e., the Tier 1 units or the national assets, are leading in this field. 
2. Structure: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
A typical military organization is strongly hierarchical, with multiple 
departments, divisions, and levels of management, leadership, and command. Each of 
these levels answers to a higher level of authority. Vertically tall hierarchical 
bureaucracies are known for redundancy and rigidity and for slow learning and 
implementation of changes. The nature of such an organization precludes it from using 
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fluid solutions such as temporary structures and makes it prone to creating new divisions 
and departments. During the implementation of changes and learning, such an 
organization grows—and this brings more implications. The qualities of flat, agile and 
nimble organizations are usually missing. 
b. SOF 
The structure of SOF units is usually flatter than those of the conventional 
military. Smaller units are more favorable to rapid organizational learning, but a 
hierarchical quality is still present. Due to their dispositions, SOF units tend to be less 
rigid and more nimble, but temporary teams or dynamic networks are not typically 
present. Because the use of task forces and task units is a common practice, the utility of 
learning teams further elevates the SOF’s ability to learn as an organization. 
3. Systems: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
Decisions are made at higher levels of management, and the tendency to 
follow established rules prevails. Day-to-day business is based on routine, driven by rules 
and SOPs. Performances measures use task-focused metrics and do not measure learning. 
Due to the size, height, and bureaucratic nature of the organization, the decisions made 
and processes to be influenced take more time. The routine execution of tasks vastly 
predominates over organizational learning and innovation. 
b. SOF 
Typically, SOFs are less hierarchical and bureaucratic than the 
conventional military, but both characteristics are still present. Where the tendency to 
delegate decisions to lower echelons prevails, the unit is more agile and nimble. Due to 
its smaller size and the greater maturity and experience of its personnel, a SOF is more 
prone to innovation and learning. The widely used practice of developing, testing, and 
fielding new equipment through an SOF is well known. Practices that lead to innovation 
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and improvement in the execution of tasks, and a receptivity to innovative solutions, are 
more frequently present within an SOF than within the military at large. Under conditions 
of increasing operational tempo, a tendency to focus on execution may skew the learning 
dynamic towards exploitative, and thus hinder the unit in its long-term effort. As a further 
detriment to SOF learning, the unit may have a fast turnover of personnel, making 
knowledge gaining, sharing, and retention difficult. 
4. Shared Values: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
In the traditional military, shared values are often arbitrarily imposed by 
superiors. These values limit open discussion, constant questioning, or raising 
awareness.160 Such values are more focused on execution of orders and performance, and 
are less supportive of practices needed in a learning organization. As the tolerance for 
mistakes is low, learning is inhibited. 
b. SOF 
The values of an SOF organization are nested within its services’ values. 
Due to the nature of their tasks, and their tasks’ indirect nature, these values are more 
supportive of organizational learning, but do not necessarily match them. On the other 
hand, the coherence of small teams supports the need to innovate and to act on innovative 
approaches. This effort is further heightened by the unit’s (i.e., team or platoon’s) 
imbalance of size; frequently favoring the enemy, for imbalance can be leveraged by 
innovative solutions. Further, the typical SOF value of “excellence” is supportive to 
practices of learning. 
                                                 
160  For example the U.S. Army core values are: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, 
integrity, and personal courage. Such values do support superior performance, but do not promote 
organizational learning. http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/rv5_downloads/values/armyvalues.pdf. 
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5. Style: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
The pervasive management style in military units is highly centralized 
control, as compared to learning organizations, where the leadership style is closer to that 
of facilitator or coach.161 Control is useful for efficiency and effectiveness. While the 
latter are inherent values in the traditional hierarchical organization, learning 
organizations, by contrast, aim for excellence and organizational renewal. Managers 
within a bureaucratic organization expect performance per given standards. Balancing 
imperfections among staff, admitting one’s own imperfections, and creating a 
collaborative working environment are not present. 
b. SOF 
The size of SOF units drives them away from a control-driven approach. 
Although bureaucracy and hierarchy have some impact on an SOF, the size of 
subordinate units and mode of work support less strict control. SOF units tend to be more 
flexible and prone to open culture, and thus more likely to have an innovation-friendly 
internal environment. Where SOF units with more conventional approaches in leadership 
style will be commensurately less likely to spur learning and innovation, those focused 
more on facilitating and coaching will arrange the unit in a manner suitable for learning. 
6. Staff: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
While the traditional military does seek hard work and performance, it is 
more in line with a traditional organization that seeks efficiency and effectiveness. They 
can select their staff to some degree, since volunteers must pass certain requirements, but 
the qualities sought are associated with performance and following. Thus problem 
                                                 
161  Ajay Agarval, Learning Organization, HR Folks, 8, accessed June 6, 2012. 
http://www.hrfolks.com/articles/learning%20organization/learning%20organization.pdf. 
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seekers and problems solvers are not specifically valued in the general military. The 
systems in place do not utilize them, since performance is based on norms and standards 
more than anything else. Employees are motivated to perform and to stay within the 
boundaries of the system—crossing these boundaries is not encouraged. Whatever 
innovation and learning takes place is exploitative in nature, and exploration happens 
only under certain conditions: for example, when in a crisis. For the members of such an 
organization, dialogue and open discussion are not common practice. 
b. SOF 
The usual practice of acquiring personnel within SOF is selection; as such 
selection criteria are of great importance. When focused on the right qualities, the 
selection process can have a critical impact on the unit in the long term. While lowering 
standards may bring more friendly numbers at any given time, adherence to a strictly 
quality-focused approach will bring a promising future. Units that seek diversity and the 
ability to learn and value problem seekers and solvers naturally build their capacity to 
learn and innovate. Maintaining high selection standards and focusing on the right 
qualities is one of the best tools readily available to a SOF. As do business leaders, SOFs 
tend to focus on hiring the best possible, but also need to instill confidence in existing 
personnel as well. Such practices support retention within the unit. Due to its focus of 
quality, a SOF is better suited for learning, but the overall degree of success is influenced 
by the execution and degree of capitalization upon tools available. 
7. Skills: Military versus SOF 
a. Military 
Within the traditional military, the prevailing focus is on adaptive 
learning, and their shared values support this type of learning. Interpersonal and 




focuses on execution and expects its employees to achieve standards; it does not really 
need such skills. To become a learning organization, many significant changes would 
need to take place. 
b. SOF 
While the conventional military is clearly predisposed to adaptive 
learning, SOF can go on to achieve generative learning. Such learning is enabled by 
proper selection, managerial practices, instilled values, and effective strategy. As the unit 
structure becomes more flat, the dominant learning skills of the SOF can shift from 
adaptive to generative. 
B. SUMMARY OF COMPARISON 
As a part of larger military forces, SOFs share some of the characteristics 
of the whole. A SOF is not as strongly hierarchical and tall as the rest of the military, but 
it remains a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization. From the organizational 
standpoint, there are certain advantages of SOFs over conventional militaries that are 
supportive to organizational learning. 
SOF’s peacetime engagement includes a diverse set of activities. Their 
smaller size and internal culture, supporting a bottom-up approach, may have a 
supportive effect on organizational learning. Differences among SOF units may be 
expected to have an impact on organizational learning as well. Higher operational tempo, 
together with a high turnover of people, may limit organizational learning, because 
sharing knowledge and information becomes harder. Larger SOFs may, under such 
conditions, be harder to staff with the required high-quality personnel. The smaller size of 
a SOF basic unit, as comparing to conventional units, creates better conditions for 
learning and innovation. The selection of leaders and the leadership style they employ 
have a major influence on learning ability. The selection process for a SOF, together with 
promotion practices, may bring a reasonable difference in it predisposition towards 
organizational learning, although the high turnover and operational tempo create 
obstacles to maintaining the highest standards. 
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It is less complicated for SOF to become a learning organization than for a 
conventional military. As a result of the differences outlined in this section, SOF is also 
more likely to learn and innovate. However, to become a learning organization, the SOF 
still needs to make adjustments and changes within its organizational structure and 
practices. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. METHODS DESCRIPTION 
1. Survey Design and Description 
The survey “SOF as a Learning Organization” was based on information related 
to learning organizations, organized into two main sections. The first section aimed at 
determining the presence of ten elements deemed supportive of organizational 
learning.162 The second section asked demographic questions to capture information 
about respondent backgrounds. See Appendix A for the complete survey instrument.  
The questions in the demographic section were about nationality, rank, experience 
in the military and SOF, and previous positions. These demographics were gathered at 
the end of survey, on the assumption that, due to the secretive nature of the units 
surveyed, some respondents might be reticent. The thought was that, having devoted time 
to more substantive questions, they would be inclined to answer the demographic 
questions as well. Further, with this ordering, if the respondent chose not to complete the 
demographics, he would at least have answered the substantive questions. 
2. Survey Pretesting and Fielding 
The questions in the survey were based on the literature described in Chapter II. 
The formulation of questions started early in this research and was discussed with Mr. 
Doowan Lee and Professor Frank Barrett at NPS. The manner of questioning and several 
specific questions were inspired by a Harvard Business Review article by David Garvin, 
Amy Edmondson, and Francesca Gino, “Is Yours a Learning Organization?”163 This 
                                                 
162  These elements were: Framing and Reframing, Intelligent Failure, Balanced Exploration and 
Exploitation, Psychological Safety, Manager’s Tasks Supportive to Organizational Learning, Learning 
Teams, Mental Models, Selection, Learning Infrastructure, Organized to Learn. 
163  David A. Garvin, Amy C. Edmondson, and Francesca Gino, "Is Yours a Learning Organization?" 
Harvard Business Review 86, no. 3 (2008): 109–116. 
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article concerns a web-based tool that assesses a company’s capabilities as a learning 
organization. After the survey questions were written, they were presented to four 
students for clarity and comprehension. The last phase of preparation was entering the 
questions into the online survey engine, SurveyMonkey. Six people were asked to take 
the survey online, and discussion took place to assess to what degree the survey was clear 
and how well the respondents understood the questions—in other words, whether the 
respondents’ understanding was congruent with the author’s intent. Based on these 
discussions, some questions were reformulated and clarifying comments and instructions 
were added. Regardless of the effort to pretest for congruence, one of the elements was 
not addressed properly, and thus the questions about managers’ mental models were 
really asking about the degree to which the unit was organized to execute. 
The web-based survey tool, SurveyMonkey, allows quick and easy creation of 
surveys and evaluation of results. An advantage is its ability to contact and track 
respondents. Because the IRB at NPS approved the recruitment letters as well as the 
survey questions, contacting the respondents was a matter of having their email 
addresses. For a complete set of recruitment letters, see Appendix B.  
After the respondent email addresses were input into SurveyMonkey, contact was 
easy. The sending of thank-you letters and reminders was based on the current progress 
of the survey. Time horizons were subject to the current schedule and the effort to 
maintain awareness of the survey itself. Based on the typical NPS student schedule, this 
allowed sending reminders when the ability to respond seemed most likely. A Web-based 
survey is easy to access, so emailed reminders were sent according to when the 
respondents might be at their computers. Non-responding persons were reminded 
approximately every 3–4 days, avoiding weekends and targeting the morning hours when 
respondents were most likely to check their mailboxes.164 
                                                 
164  The guidance for fielding survey and implementing reminders was mostly based on Don A. Dillman, 
Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method 2007 Update with New Internet, Visual, and 
Mixed-Mode Guide (New Jersey: Wiley, 2006).  
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The survey was fielded for three months, from February through April 2012, and 
administered in two waves: first in English and then, for comparison, in the native 
language of the unit. For fidelity, the translations were verified by a native speaker who 
was also an NPS graduate. Before fielding, both surveys were tested to ensure that 
question content and formulation would be understood by the respondents. 
3. Survey Respondents 
The survey was fielded in two locations. One, intended to examine the pool of DA 
students with a SOF background, was sent to all DA students. Respondents who enrolled 
in the program but were non-SOF were later taken out of the raw data set. The second 
location was chosen for comparison purposes, and a newer, non-U.S., NATO SOF unit 
was used. This unit adopted the NATO SOF principles fewer than fifteen years ago and 
was smaller than U.S. Army Special Forces. 
A total of 123 surveys was collected, including 71 U.S. and 52 international SOF 
officers and noncommissioned officers. Figure 3 shows the ratio of U.S. to international 
respondents. 
 
Figure 3.   Respondent nationalities: U.S. vs. International 
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The 51 international respondents were from ten countries.165 Only four 
respondents were from non-NATO countries.166 Figure 4 shows respondents by country. 
 
Figure 4.   Respondents by country 
Due to a lack of representation from some nations, the U.S. and one international 
SOF unit with significant representation (“Other” in Figure 2) were used for the main 
comparison. A comparison of U.S. data with the entire international data was used in 
separate, secondary analyses. 
Respondent ranks ranged from E-6 to O-5. A majority of the respondents (70) 
were O-4s. Figure 5 shows the distribution of respondent ranks. 
                                                 
165  Countries included Colombia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Turkey. 
166  Respondents from non-NATO countries (number of respondents) were Colombia (2), Sri Lanka 
(1) and Taiwan (1). 
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Figure 5.   Distribution of respondent ranks 
The respondents had a total of 1,533 years of cumulative military experience and 
936 years of SOF experience. A majority of the respondents (83) were last assigned at 
company level or below (including team members). 
The variable size of the samples limited what can be inferred from the data. For 
example, a majority of respondents were students at NPS in the DA department and were 
not, as such, representative of the SOF population in general. In particular, students at 
NPS are a distinct slice of the broader SOF population and they are usually captains or 
majors.  
The comparison made between U.S. SOF branches and the non-U.S., NATO SOF 
units offers insights, but cannot be used for any exact, measurable comparison; thus the 
results of our comparison yield something more like a preview than a precise result. 
Furthermore, this comparison is expected to be skewed, due to the fact that most U.S. 
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respondents held the rank of major, while the “other” unit members ranged from E-6 to 
O-5. A comparison between U.S. field-grade officers and a slice across the unit is not a 
comparison of identical groups. 
It is safe to assume that students at NPS represent an above-average quality of 
officers, whether U.S. or international. As these students must pass certain criteria to be 
enrolled, it is reasonable to assume that their responses have value of notice. Also, their 
cumulative experience is high. 
4. Response Rates 
The main guidance on how to implement the survey was drawn from Dillman’s 
Mail and Internet Survey.167 Dillman’s book provides detailed instructions on how to 
implement a survey in order to get the highest response rate. The details on the structure 
of recruitment letters, reminders, and thank-you letters were very useful. The author 
believes that the use of Dillman’s tailored design method, as well as the professional 
interest of NPS students with SOF backgrounds, was the main reason for the 
exceptionally high response rate. Within two weeks after the instrument was fielded, the 
response rates were 76% answered partially and 69% answered fully. By the end of the 
fielding period, the final response rates were 81.7% answered partially and 73.9% 
answered fully. The response rates from non-U.S. NATO SOF units were much smaller. 
During the time the survey was fielded, the vast majority of the unit members were 
deployed to other locations. 
5. Interview 
The main technique used for gathering data was the critical-incident interview. 
These interviews were focused on events related to organizational learning, new insights, 
transfer of knowledge, and applying new information in order to change behavior. The 
critical-incident interview is a qualitative method and its main strength is the depth of 
                                                 
167  Don A. Dillman, Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method 2007 Update with New 
Internet, Visual, and Mixed-Mode Guide (New Jersey: Wiley, 2006).  
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insight available. The idea was to gather concise stories from each interviewee’s 
experience that would relate to learning. Interviews were afterwards coded to search for 
patterns and similarities. See appendix C, for complete interview protocol. 
Fifteen interviews were conducted, each lasting, on average, an hour and twenty 
minutes. Each interview yielded six to eight stories, on average. The majority of stories 
were related to the interviewee’s time while serving within a SOF unit or in support of a 
SOF unit. Some stories dated as far back as the interviewee’s time of service within a 
conventional unit, before his time in SOF. 
Conducting interviews in English with native English speakers was not an easy 
task for an international student. Most interviews were done in collaboration with 
Professor Frank Barrett, who demonstrated how to run the interviews and helped the 
author focus on the right questions, using correct ways of asking. Barrett supported the 
author not only in the preparation, but also in the conduct and subsequent analysis of 
interviews. 
The diversity of the interviewees, together with their candor, brought up a variety 
of stories. The majority of the stories were their own, though some were retellings of 
someone else’s. The excellent quality and content of the stories was due to the 
interviewees’ considerable experience, openness, and honesty. This willingness to trust 
may be attributed to identification with the author’s similar military background and 
experiences in the fields of operation. 
The interview sample did not contain any international officers. The stories were 
told from the American perspective, and when these covered any allied forces, it was due 
to their common experience or operating together.  
Regarding the number of interviewees, an effort was made to strike a balance 
proportionate to the size of the different units within a U.S. SOF. Consequently, eight 
U.S. Army Special Forces officers, three U.S. Navy SEAL officers, one civil-affairs 
officer, one PSYOP officer, one U.S. Air Force SOF pilot, and one U.S. Army military 
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intelligence officer were interviewed.168 These students represented three cohorts of DA 
department students at NPS during the same period. 
B. SURVEY RESULTS 
Out of ten sets of questions addressing ten component variables, four sets yielded 
statistically significant differences among the components. These sets were framing and 
reframing, learning infrastructure, organizing to execute, and selection of personnel. 
 
Figure 6.   Ranking comparison by component 
As shown in Figure 4, comparing the results (one-way analysis of variance) 
produced a fairly consistent ranking of mean scores by organization: 1-SEALs, 2-Army 
SF, 3-non-U.S. SOF Unit, 4-PSYOP, 5-CA. A closer look reveals that this pattern is 
occasionally disrupted.  
                                                 
168  The U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer had over two decades of service and over one third of 
his service time spent working within SOF community. 
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These occasional disruptions can be observed in answers to framing and 
reframing-related questions, and learning teams and learning-infrastructure-related 
questions. While the non-U.S. SOF unit stepped up in rank in framing and reframing, 
PSYOP stepped up in learning teams and learning infrastructure. Based on the author’s 
knowledge of the non-U.S. SOF unit, the assessment is that this relatively young unit is 
still capable of, and more likely to, frame new hurdles as challenges. Based on interview 
#9, the high ranking of PSYOP in the use of learning teams and learning infrastructure is 
created by necessity.169 While the PSYOP units within the branch are structurally 
distinguished into two regions, due to the high number of deployments, the members of 
the branch spend the majority of their time deployed. So the extent of deployments, 
together with pre-mission training and post-mission requirements, resulted in severe time 
limitations for the units to actually use their structure (structural channels). Thus PSYOP 
is forced by conditions to use ad hoc teams to solve issues and tackle organizational 
challenges. 
The almost pattern-like ranking is due to the consistency of the answers provided. 
One of the obvious possible explanations is that there really is a degree of difference 
among SOF branches and units, and the difference is consistent across many learning-
organization domains. However, due to the limited sample size, this conclusion can 
safely be reached only if a larger survey is fielded and confirms these results. Such a 
survey would ideally consider whole-unit-sized samples. For this thesis, at least, those 
statistically significant can be elaborated on. 
Comparing means (outcomes of the one-way analysis of variance) directly 
provides additional insights. 
                                                 
169  Interview #9, was conducted with an Army Officer who is currently a student at NPS who came 
from serving in PSYOP branch, and conducted multiple deployments to Central Asia and Latin America,  
 74
 
Figure 7.   Direct comparison of mean responses by component 
As depicted in Figure 7, as pertained to certain structural and procedural elements, 
the span of answers yielded varied results. Answers to other elements produced very 
similar responses across the pool of respondents—for example, the comparison of results 
related to intelligent failure, learning teams, psychological safety and selection of 
personnel showed very little difference by component. Additionally, in the case of 
intelligent failure, when the one subset that differed most (PSYOP, mean=higher value 
than others) is taken out, all the other subsets have means within 0.1 (one decimal) of the 
average. For learning teams, taking similar steps, the largest difference of mean is 0.16, 
and for psychological safety and selection are 0.22 and 0.09. In other words, comparison 
of some of the elements yielded very similar results.  
In relation to intelligent failure, and with the exception of the PSYOP respondents 
who yielded even worse results than other subsets, all other results were very close. In 
other words, failure is not too much embraced, even in when outcomes are uncertain. 
This can be caused by a focus on execution, rather than learning, which may be a result 
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of the high operational tempo and frequent deployments of the last decade. But since the 
causes were not examined in the survey, this is more speculation than a result grounded 
in data. 
The questions related to use of learning teams showed, that with the exception of 
PSYOP, the use of the learning teams is not made to a greater extent. 
Questions related to psychological safety, though least related to each other in 
comparison with the other three elements mentioned here, again showed some similarity. 
Without the CA, who produced the highest response value, the results are close to 
average— neither strongly supportive, nor against—showing that within the survey 
sample, to speak up openly and express one’s opinion may not be the most common 
thing. However, for sharing ideas and insights, psychological safety is one of the most 
important elements an organization need, so this might be an area to examine further. 
The last area where analysis of the subsets produced very similar results was 
selection.  Selection in relation to organizational learning, where the differences among 
subsets were statistically significant, showed that with the exception of SEALs, the 
responding entities approach selection in pretty much the same way. The results also 
showed that the SEAL approach to selection is considerably more likely to produce 
people supportive of organizational learning. 
Discussion as to why the results are similar in some cases and dissimilar in others 
would be speculation. Without gathering data aimed at these causes, the best possible 
approach is to ask questions or draw possible hypothesis.  
Possible hypothesis: 
 Selection for SEALs (BUDs) is more prone to select individuals 
supportive of organizational learning. 
 Larger size of the branch influences negatively the ability to learn as an 
organization. 
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1. Conclusions from SOF as a Learning Organization survey 
Some branches and units are more prone to learn as organizations than others; that 
is, there is a degree of difference in organizational learning among the components. The 
survey results yielded a fairly consistent ranking across the ten elements supportive to 
organizational learning. That ranking is: 1-SEALs, 2-Army SF, 3-non-U.S. SOF unit, 4-
PSYOP, 5-CA. 
Based on these results, it seems that the selection process for SEALs is more 
supportive to organizational learning. While the rest showed fairly similar results, the 
SEAL process is more likely to produce officers and non-commissioned officers who are 
suited for and supportive of organizational learning. 
There are four underutilized areas of elements supportive to organizational 
learning. When focusing on improvements in organizational learning, improvement in 
these areas, or changing the approaches that contribute to this underutilization, might be 
the first thing to look at. These areas are: intelligent failure, learning teams, psychological 
safety, and learning infrastructure. 
C. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
1. Overview 
Analysis of the interviews was conducted with the aim of identifying recurrent 
themes common to members of the SOF community across a variety of services. The 
criteria for the themes were as follows: 
 Themes related to organizational learning, with some impact on 
organizational learning 
 Presence in multiple interviews, ideally in interviews with members from 
more than one service 
 Occurrence where both positive and negative connotations of outcomes 
took place 
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The interviews started with the solicitation of some brief demographic 
information, to gain an initial knowledge of the interviewee’s background and set up the 
context for initial and follow-up questions. Subsequent questions solicited stories relating 
to situations that allowed for new insight or knowledge, and further spreading and 
implementation of the same. Each of the fifteen interviewees provided between six and 
eight stories, on average. These stories were coded, and ten reoccurring themes were 
identified. 
The themes are introduced, together with their justification for inclusion. Each 
justification is supported by paraphrased excerpts from stories produced during the 
interviews. The first seven themes are related to gaining new insights, information, and 
knowledge. The last three themes are related to implementing new insights. 
2. Challenges 
Before describing the learning themes, it is appropriate to summarize the kinds of 
challenges that SOF officers often face. Describing these challenges helps us understand 
the complexity of the situations SOF officers and non-commissioned officers often face. 
a. Tacit, Practical Knowledge  
The decision-making situations that SOF members face are often very 
complex. They require responses to emergent problems and contingencies without the 
benefit of the clear directions, goals, planning, or rules that are sometimes found in 
lessons-learned documents. In these complicated situations, SOF officers need to 
improvise and respond, on the spot, to ad hoc, ill-formulated, or ambiguous problems. 
Under conditions of radical uncertainty, actors rarely have the time or resources to 
analyze or create adequate predictive models of ends-oriented action. Actors are more 
likely to experiment and move quickly without the benefit of a priori rules. The kind of 
knowledge needed is rarely explicit theoretical knowledge, although a degree of this kind 
of knowledge is certainly helpful.  Rather, it is skillful, practical knowledge—an 
embodied awareness of how to respond as contextual and situational cues warrant.   
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One SOF operator described his first arrival at a firebase, depicting what it 
means to be an experienced person in this situation. When he arrived on the base, the 
others had been there a year and were combat-seasoned fighters. He realized that the 
others had a “know-how” that he did not have, and that they could see contextual cues he 
could not yet see.   
I could see right away that they were different. They had a different 
mentality.  They were more alert, although seemed to be laid back, but the way they 
carried themselves, one could see they were always ready for a fight.  By that time they 
knew how business is done.  Myself and my guys were still green. As we went to our first 
combat patrol, being a new guy you’re only concerned with enemy threat.  But the 
seasoned guy could see everything.  We were heads on a swivel, but we did not really see 
anything. (#2, Army) 
His first patrols were learning experiences.  He had to learn what to notice.  He reported: 
We had an uneventful first patrol; we saw how they operate, how they 
establish check points, how they function day to day. We also met some influential locals. 
(#2, Army)  
When he returned from these early patrols, he learned how to embed with 
an ODA that was already there. He learned by watching the way the experienced SOF 
operators did their work and how they filled sitreps. Within a short time, he became more 
comfortable and became acquainted with this environment: 
As a team, once it was our team and our fire base I never felt there was 
anything we couldn’t accomplish.  I never felt completely unprepared. (#2, Army) 
The question is, how do these SOF operators advance from the point of 
noticing that experienced people see, act, and think differently to the point where they 
also see, act, and think differently and feel completely prepared.  This is the question this 
thesis seeks to address. 
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b. Collaboration 
One of the most difficult challenges that emerged was collaborating with 
groups outside one’s own team. Several of the research participants mentioned the 
challenge of having to collaborate with groups such as the Afghan national police, the 
Afghan national army, local tribal elders and informal leaders, allied conventional forces, 
allied international forces, state department representatives, and the Iraqi police. They 
were usually not trained to work with parties who have different values, goals, time 
horizons, and skills.  The SOF officers we interviewed had to negotiate and collaborate 
with several stakeholders and continually assess whether these stakeholders were reliable 
partners who would contribute to the mission: Afghan forces, Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs), conventional forces, allies, civilians.  Creating relationships with locals 
was a key task, because it was through these relationships that the SOF officers gained 
credibility and the trust of the local people, and sometimes even learned about the 
presence of enemy forces in the area.  If they could establish good working relationships 
with the locals, they might become informants who would lead to important intelligence 
regarding the location of enemies. The challenge of collaboration with PRTs was in 
coordinating common efforts within diverse sets of missions and with limited mutual 
understanding. In general, the challenges of collaborating with these groups were “new” 
challenges, in that these were not the kind of tasks that SOF officers are necessarily 
conditioned for. However, each research participant struggled to find innovative ways to 
work with these various groups, and some were more successful than others. Often these 
innovations were small experiments that expanded into wider strategies, and sometimes 
the understanding came after the opportunity to collaborate was gone.   
c. Bureaucratic Chain of Command 
Another challenge officers and NCOs face is direction from the 
bureaucratic chain of command, which often seems unaware of the situation on the 
ground.  The SOF officers have to find a way to navigate through the policy mandates 
and political reality of the situation, the priorities of higher headquarters, and priorities on 
the ground as they emerge. These are often in conflict, and the officers have to learn how 
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to balance them and make appropriate decisions.  They have to learn to work within 
bureaucratic and legalistic constraints that disrupt their ability to accomplish their 
assumed mission, often leading to frustration. One of the interviewees described how, 
after a successful operation, an IED emplacer got detained. Within a short period, this 
person got transferred to a detention facility in Bagram and the team never heard of him 
again. A similar pattern was related to evidence gained during the SSE phase of an 
operation. Once the evidence was secured, the team gave it to site exploitation specialists. 
The team never heard from the exploitation team or got information about the evidence. 
These are but two examples of information, gained at some risk, that were automatically 
underutilized due to the larger system. 
d. Limited Transfer of Knowledge 
Another challenge SOF officers face is the limited transfer of knowledge. 
Many times, hard-won knowledge gets misplaced, stops somewhere, or, for various 
reasons, does not get transferred. As a result, people facing similar situations need to 
come up with a solution to a problem that has already been dealt with, but the data on 
successful and unsuccessful solutions is unavailable. This waste of information prolongs 
the time needed to solve the problem, and for observers, may create the illusion of an 
infinite chain of trying the same wrong approaches again and again. For one observer, it 
seems a waste of time; for others, it lowers the credibility of the problem solver. Many 
officers described this problem. Some of the examples were futile attempts to locate files 
on a certain country while preparing to go there to conduct a JCET and be relevant to 
previous efforts; too much focus on successful examples of lessons learned and lack of 
balance with those which were unsuccessful; and SODARS that failed to reach the team 
prior to deployment. This challenge, together with the limitations embedded in the use of 
written forms for transfer of knowledge, put SOF officers and non-commissioned officers 
into the position where they had to retry what was tried before, without knowing what did 
and what did not work. 
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e. Direct Action Focus 
There are many reasons the direct approach to achievement of mission 
objectives seems more appropriate on many occasions. Some possibilities are the easy 
metrics of killed and captured, instead of influence gained and governance improved. 
Others might be the reasons people sign up for SOF in the first place: the recruitment 
tools that attract by pictures and videos of snipers, HALO jumpers, operators fighting 
with highly tuned up equipment, or the wider public’s knowledge limited to numbers of 
losses on both sides. The focus within training is a self-inflicted limitation, by which it is 
much easier and more attractive to go out to the range and shoot or to visit a driving 
school and drive, which are certainly more attractive, and possibly more accessible, than 
to spend time in language school or learn about governance. And yet, the environment of 
the current conflict needs a more indirect approach. Fortunately, the interviewees noticed 
some recent attempts to meet this problem, though these attempts were taking place ten 
years into a war in Afghanistan. Many interviewees mentioned the presence of this 
challenge, citing commanders from multiple levels focused on capture/kill metrics, 
operators focusing on direct actions and omitting, or even refusing to conduct, 
engagements with local representatives and the population, and deployment preparation 
that covered range sessions and direct-action missions but not key-leader engagements 
and gaining the support of local governance. Focusing on direct skills inherently limits 
the pursuit of indirect skills, and this is equally true when it comes to information, 
knowledge seeking, training, and preparation, as well as execution while deployed. 
f. Limited Support 
The external unit support to deployed SOF units is generally of a high 
standard. Locally the case may be slightly different. Multiple interviewees mentioned 
situations when they were forced to come up with a solution because of lack of air 
support, inadequate or missing intelligence, low numbers of troops, lack of experience 
captured from their current location, or limited financial resources, which limits the 
acquisition of  equipment. These conditions can be perceived as a constituent of the 
conflict environment. If that is the case, should not the solutions to these inadequacies be 
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part of a common toolbox given to SOF operators and leaders? Should not these tools be 
handed over to them during training, conditioning, and experience sharing? The need to 
come up with innovative solutions testifies that such transfer did not take place to the full 
extent possible. Examples of limited support ranged from inability to infiltrate forces by 
air assets (in one instance, since the parachute option was deemed not viable, a team was 
forced to drive through IED-rich roads many times without ever reaching the target 
village) to the lack of intelligence from an area and nonexistent support’s leading to a 
completely new concept of the mission’s conduct. To believe that support is always 
readily available is as naïve as to believe that lack of support does not hurt the mission. 
g. Lack of Trust 
Sharing insights, information, and knowledge is enabled by trust. When 
distrust is present, it may limit the transfer of knowledge and information. A lack of trust 
may only be perceived, but it still can impose limitations. One of the interviewees 
mentioned that the reason certain modes of deployment or mission solutions were not 
approved was lack of trust. In a majority of examples of cooperation with local forces, 
i.e. the ANA or ANP, the way the mission was conducted was to tell the forces to be 
ready in thirty minutes without giving them the information well ahead of time, or clear 
directions on what and where the objectives of the mission were. But as depicted by a 
story in which knowledge of the local forces led to a change of vehicles used in the area 
(in order to counter an IED threat), some insights are relayed by the local people only. 
Another example of trust-related issues was described on multiple occasions, when 
deployed team members did some adjustments, i.e. to vehicles, etc., and the superior 
commander had to come to see and experience the local conditions; the mere message or 
sitrep from the subordinate commander did not make the cut. Examples related to trust 
were frequent, and the consequences of these ranged from delays to prevention.  
3. Themes 
Ten prominent themes emerged from the interviews. These themes are 
listed, described, and supported by paraphrasing the relevant portions. Paraphrasing 
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rather than transcribing was used to assure confidentiality. Confidentiality was important 
both to encourage openness during the interviews and to shield speakers from being held 
to account for their statements. 
Theme 1 - Sharing knowledge through written reports and standardized 
formats is important, but not sufficient for understanding complexity 
and emerging challenges that are not anticipated. 
For sharing knowledge and insights, the military uses many different 
formats, e.g., after-action reports, SODARS, and situational reports. For successful 
knowledge transfer, these tools have many flaws that limit their likelihood of success. 
Also, sometimes these reports may not be readily accessible at the crucial time they are 
needed. 
Justification 
The majority of those interviewed mentioned that the transfer of 
knowledge and experience was hampered by factors limiting the overall utility of formats 
and reports. One problem is that it takes time and motivation to write a full and 
comprehensive report that provides a coherent picture of a complex event. Further, these 
reports cannot capture the contextual details and unique challenges that emerge as 
situations change. Reports can only convey a sense of what happened previously. This 
does not mean that reports are not useful.  They are very useful for capturing a history 
and alerting SOF officers to contextual cues in a particular area—the nature of the local 
terrain, the occasional presence of high-value targets, the personal proclivities of village 
leaders, governors, and police chiefs, and the skill level of Afghan allies, etc. This 
information is important.  One of the difficulties in relying on reports for learning is that 
people are not always motivated to sit down and write reports for anonymous successors 
to read. According to the interviewees, several innovative, proven practices were 
probably not passed on to future teams because of the rapid tempo of day-to-day patrols 
and fighting and the scarcity of time to sit, reflect, and articulate lessons learned.   
Quality of reports is largely driven by human factor. Some people take 
their time and write these reports; while others perceive it as not as cool thing to do, for 
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typing is for nerds. Others do leave the report out to the last moment before the end of 
deployment, and when filling it out the report becomes a matter of filling the paper 
somehow, more than to provide a comprehensive sum of knowledge. So it’s likely that 
important details never get conveyed. The reasons are the amount of time and effort to 
put together a large sum of words, and the considerable time spent while writing, as 
oppose to doing something else, possibly more interesting and urgent. Once I was 
looking for reports on a certain African country, and even after few years of experience 
in this country, the reports I found were due to their poor quality not useful for my 
deployment. (# 15, Army) 
Another reason for the limited utility of transferring knowledge via written 
formats and reports is that the recipient needs to take time to read them; and once these 
reports and formats become of a limited availability, the transfer has stopped. 
Prior to deployment to an African country, I was looking for reports 
written by another ODA some two years back. I failed to locate them within the system 
designed for sharing these reports. Later on, while I served at a different position within 
the same unit, and when one of the former members working on the database returned to 
download the reports, he showed us that these reports were saved to a folder nobody 
could find. (# 15, Army) 
In a system largely dependent on the circulation of written reports, it is 
perceived as unsafe to memorialize information that is negative in nature. Learning from 
mistakes is important, and if the mistakes are not communicated or shared, people are 
doomed to repeat them. But when sharing mistakes is expected to have bad consequences 
for one’s reputation or career, the probability of doing so is low. 
To go through the AARs and find somebody’s statement acknowledging he 
made a mistake is a challenging task. Nobody is prepared to write that he made a stupid 
mistake. Once the information gets written and goes out, nobody is prepared to be super 
honest. (#7, Navy) 
In general, when choosing which stories to share in a written report, 
positive stories are shared more often than negative. 
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We don’t select the important stories well; people tend to pick what 
worked. Nobody wants to admit he screwed up. And it is hard to enforce that. Not 
everybody is prepared to do it, although a lot of people do. (#4, Army) 
Truthful reporting is enabled by trust; if the perceived trust is low, the 
reporting might be skewed: 
In general, due to the limitations imposed upon us while fulfilling 
missions, team leaders did not feel trusted. The universal feel was that we have to be 
attached to the radio all the time and be ready to describe the situation at any time. 
Under such conditions it might be even convenient to tell the commander what he wants 
to hear. (#3, Army) 
Written reports inevitably lack sufficient context and detail. Answers to 
every possible question are not available. Each person interprets the information slightly 
differently, and only the possibility of questioning allows for making sense and fully 
understanding the data. 
The need to discuss the issues is because people have questions. The 
interaction, emotions, and need to articulate trigger thinking. Each person asks different 
questions, and without answers, they may be limited in understanding. The written piece 
is a minimum, but that only lets everybody know that something happened. For 
understanding, they need to stop and ask. (#8, Air Force) 
Due to high workload, report writing is not a high priority. Under 
deployment conditions, writing a coherent report receives less attention and time than it 
really deserves. Inadequate reports are the result. 
Some people are too busy to do the reports properly, when asked to 
perform twenty different things; one does the five that do not get him into trouble. 
Reports do belong to the other fifteen. There is a need to assure quality of reports. (#15, 
Army) 
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Not all reports reach their recipients. A large volume of papers circulating 
through an organization is hard to keep exact track of. With people constantly moving as 
well, the likelihood of a paper reaching its intended recipient is small. 
Regardless of the level of detail of reports, in our community the 
knowledge is transferred through talking. At the end of deployment, each team is tasked 
to write a detailed report on everything the team did during the deployment. The report, 
SODARS, should contain all the knowledge, all the operations, all the important names in 
the area, but very rarely that report gets pushed out to the team coming in. Afghanistan is 
a bit better since we can leave the report at the place, but for the missions without the 
constant presence, we have to find the last teams that have been there and physically get 
into contact with them. System seems well thought through, but the experience is 
different.  (#2, Army) 
The system of written reports is well thought out. But in the context of all 
moving parts—other tasks and people—on many occasions, the person who needs the 
data most may fail to receive it. To write a comprehensive report is difficult. Without 
enforcing standards of quality and giving it the appropriate attention, report writing may 
get less attention than it needs. For people to admit a mistake, they must feel safe. If they 
perceive that their report will be sent out into the larger system without any context or 
control, they will be hesitant to detail their failures. Under such conditions, the system of 
written reports and formats may fall short of its potential. 
Theme 2 - Discovering insight through questioning and storytelling.  
As one SOF officer noted, you can learn by reading reports, but the most 
important learning comes from storytelling. This often happens by serendipity. In several 
of the interviews, participants discovered insights by questioning each other, including 
Afghan allies, and sharing stories. In fact, “hanging out” and discussing a situation often 
yielded important insights that led to new approaches. These novel approaches not only 
led to successful innovation, but could help build collaborative relationships.  
Questioning and discussing support better understanding, transfer of 
knowledge, and learning. 
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After every flight we debrief, so after any mission we sit for about 30 
minutes and we talk about it. Whether it is a successful or unsuccessful mission, we sit 
down and try to throw spears and find out what went wrong, what went right, what needs 
to be changed and what is a good practice. So sitting around with mature aviators you 
really are able to learn from each other. And those experienced ones can put the years of 
flying and doing behind that discussion. (#8, Air Force) 
On my company we had meetings on a one or two-week basis. We would 
meet with the leadership and discuss all what happened that week. We would go over the 
things that popped up, what was new and what we learned. We discussed and then 
disseminated that all. There would be company and detachments leadership and we 
would discuss everything. But that was within the company. (#14, Army) 
To understand the task and environment, reading written documents, 
experiencing the setting, and observing predecessors while performing daily tasks still 
leaves questions unanswered.  
We had a very good handover. The previous team took us on patrol with 
them, made us meet couple of influential local people. But as we were new ones there and 
they were experienced in the area, I felt like fish out of water. A lot of time was spent by 
sitting around and telling stories, but their stories happened down the road and we had 
nothing. Later on they let us go through their CONOPs, orders; we could see how they 
did their day-to-day operations. And after that we just sat behind the closed door and had 
a chance to ask about just anything, no question was a dumb question and they did 
accommodate that. (#2, Army) 
Insight through serendipity may emerge from hanging out and observing 
and paying attention to minor or seemingly irrelevant details. Insight can be also gained 
by paying attention to ad hoc conversations among the coalition partners. 
As my team was new to the area and Afghanistan, the first couple of weeks 
in the firebase we spent nights at the OPs manned by ANA. Every night the ANA soldiers 
played a game where the winner was the one who could pick the make and model of the 
car the quickest. There was always a discussion over Corollas, and Hiluxes, but a 
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Humvee was easy and quick. They would even tell the difference between what convoy 
was out there. When we were there, we laughed and sometimes played the game along. 
But later, when we thought about the RC IED and the precision of the timing it gets to 
trigger it, we reflected upon it. Soon after we switched over and started to use Hiluxes 
only. (#2, Army) 
Sometimes the insight gets revealed by paying attention to one’s own as 
well as enemy forces. 
I used to be really angry when soldiers were saying that enemies were 
cowards for using IEDs and not fighting directly. I started to realize that the CAS was 
our IED to them. Our interpreters heard them over radio saying that we were cowards 
for bringing in CAS. And the engagements were always with just a few guys and at the 
long distance. And I realized I am a guy in a multimillion truck with all the stuff attached 
to it and all the high-tech support available and all I am facing are just a few guys with 
AKs and RPGs. It was just a basic stuff. And we changed our tactics after that. (#3, 
Army) 
Questioning and storytelling impart experience, knowledge and insights, 
and allow for discovering new ideas. For these results, interaction is necessary. 
Theme 3 - Sharing knowledge is effectively done through open and 
frank discussion. 
Open discussion promotes shared knowledge and insights. This involves 
two separate impulses. On the part of the learner, it involves restless curiosity and 
continual questioning. On the part of the speaker, there must be motivation to share his 
unique, idiosyncratic experience. Being together is not enough; both parties must want to 
share. There are many reasons that sharing takes place through discussion. One is that a 
discussion is a chance to ask questions and thus improve understanding; another is that 
within a discussion, there is no fear of mishandling or misplacing information. Equally 
important, there is less chance of information’s being used against an individual, 
especially when the information includes a mistake or bad decision. 
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Justification 
Knowledge sharing generally involves two parties: one with knowledge 
and the will to share it, and one without knowledge who is able to admit it, and willing to 
listen to the insights that make it enriched for the missing knowledge at the same time.  
No intermediary medium allows for open and frank sharing. 
People automatically look for bad things. So it is natural that nobody is 
willing to expose himself to any more bad press than is necessary. The time to really 
learn is a good hot wash that takes place within the unit. (#7, Navy) 
If the document is likely to leave the immediate confines of the unit, 
people may feel less safe to input certain information. The fear of losing control over 
information limits the quality and quantity of information in a document. Officers know 
that a document takes on a life of its own and a story that reports about less-than-
adequate results might later create unwanted consequences. 
When the information is planned to leave the immediate circle, nobody is 
going to be really open. Nobody will really show his cards on where he made a mistake. 
You may have an excellent relationship with your superior, but once the statement goes 
in print, the perceived safety is gone. There is no knowledge of how the information is 
going to be handled. It may be used against you. (#7, Navy) 
When confronted (presented) by new information, one may need to ask 
questions. Sometimes these questions may be related to context; other times, to a thought 
process. If these questions go unanswered, learning may not take place. Questions are an 
opportunity to learn both for the questioner and questioned. 
With written files, there is no way of asking questions, nobody can ask why 
did you do this, or what did you think at that time. The interaction is always better than 
written paper. (#8, Air Force) 
Sharing occurs among those who have experienced common hardships. 
Usually, there are no common hardships with strangers or new people. When people do 
share hardships, they know it is in their mutual interest to share insights openly. 
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For more experienced people, it is easier to gain trust. The younger ones 
need to be brought in by the older ones who already trust them. The best information 
comes out after the mission; those people who have shared the life threat will share the 
information that keeps them alive. (#7, Navy) 
People learn by listening, but when they can ask questions, they and the 
speaker educate each other. 
From my time as an instructor, I do remember that every person asks 
different questions, sometimes the question triggers new thoughts in the one who 
responds. The person can actually teach you something by asking the question. (#8, Air 
Force) 
Theme 4 - Learning often requires crossing presumed boundaries.  
Some units are more skillful at crossing these presumed boundaries. Those 
units that exercise this ability to a greater level are more successful in learning and 
innovating. Group boundaries are always present and cannot be ignored. As they are 
always present, the variation in successful transfer is caused by the degree a unit or a 
person is able to successfully work across those boundaries. Boundaries have diverse 
causes, some bureaucratic, and others structural, commercial, or financial, and they differ 
in the difficulty it takes to overcome them. 
Justification 
Implementing a solution developed outside of one’s own unit, or outside 
the military organization, or in cooperation with an outside entity, may involve barriers 
that are unrelated to the problem itself, but to the boundaries between the subjects. 
Different units fulfill different tasks; due to boundaries, the possibility of 
cooperation may not be perceived initially. Consequently, learning may be delayed. 
Working along the PRT was completely new for me. They would have a lot 
of money and were judged based on how many projects they managed to complete. But 
we did not coordinate our effort with them well enough. In the ideal world, we would 
advise them on security issues in the area, and also on which village deserves support 
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and projects and which one does not. The fault of missed coordination is obviously on 
both sides, but for us we did not really see the value of coordination until very late. If we 
coordinated better, we would get more influence in the area. (#2, Army) 
In tapping the knowledge or expertise of civilian companies, crossing 
bureaucratic boundaries may be required.  
During the development of particular software used in support of planning 
our missions, we had to tackle multiple challenges. The knowledge was out there, all we 
had to do was to break through some bureaucratic barriers between the government and 
agencies. Others were commercial in nature and were related to licensing, contracts, and 
using commercial software on secret computers. (#6, Navy) 
Boundaries between conventional units and SOFs may lower mutual 
awareness, and performing missions together may become more difficult. 
During one of the missions, I used an infantry company to set up a 
blocking position for us. While my team was pursuing the larger enemy group, the 
conventional unit saw some movement above them on the ridge line. They send single 
vehicle to check it out and the vehicle suffered an RPG hit. After that the company 
commander lost control over his unit. Once my team got back, I spread my guys across 
the company to help to lead some of the minor elements. Although I was aware that this 
was their first deployment, I learned to make better assessment of forces available. (#4, 
Army) 
Other boundaries are structural. Failing to acknowledge the quality and 
experience of others may prevent learning and sharing of experience. 
When it comes to learning from each other, sometimes the structural 
boundaries get in the way of it. If there are more experienced units, but my commander 
tells me that these are the same people only with bigger budget, it may become 
challenging. (#7, Navy) 
An example of financial boundaries can be observed in hiring preferences 
when bringing in a civilian provider of expert training. 
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Although we believe that there is a certain driving school in Arizona that 
provides for an unmatched quality of training, we may be forced to use the services of a 
cheaper one in Northern Carolina. When deciding on which one to send troops to, if the 
cheaper one advertises the same level of training, and the government saves on lodging, 
these become the basis for decision, regardless of the real quality we know. (#6, Navy) 
Theme 5 - New insights and innovative solutions are often generated 
outside of the team or unit. 
Not all good ideas are initiated from within. Units (platoons and teams) 
often use knowledge or insight from outside. When communication and collaboration 
reach outside a unit’s boundaries, ideas successfully implemented elsewhere can be used. 
While these ideas may need some adjustment to local conditions or context, using other 
people’s ideas may be faster and more effective than building knowledge on one’s own. 
When a unit performs in isolation, its limited ability to reach out can restrict learning and 
innovation. 
Justification 
A SOF unit in general is trained to perform a wide variety of tasks. For the 
amount of tasks to train for, not always the level of knowledge and skills within the unit 
reach a level of skills present within the organization with similar, but narrower task 
span. 
Although a SOF unit is trained in SSE, exposure to much more detailed 
and sophisticated ways of conducting activities can yield deeper understanding and 
knowledge of the enemy. 
One of the agencies’ members was collocated with my ODA. After sharing 
our approach to conducting SSE, they offered their way of doing it. Their way was 
clearly superior to ours, and we ended up using them as in-house training force for this 
expertise. By utilizing their approach, we were able not only to put more pieces together, 
but we were also able to get some usable information out of it. (#2, Army) 
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Some security sectors traditionally specialize in certain areas of expertise. 
While this is driven by their uses and needs, expanding a unit’s skillset by reaching out to 
these sectors may offer valuable insights and faster learning. 
Within our unit, we used dogs since a long time ago. The development of 
the training for the specifics of indoor use, and the development of new TTPs, equipment, 
and infrastructure was effectively done with the cooperation of K-9 unit. (#6, Navy) 
External cooperation, grounded in the system, can bring continuous 
innovation and learning. When there is a need for more than a one-time solution, properly 
established channels help bring in, evaluate, and test new ideas. 
Our unit had a research and development section, and they were 
continuously communicating with people outside of the military, the commercial 
companies. While utilizing the proper channels, they were able to continually consider 
and to test new parts or new capabilities added to the airframe. Some of the airframes 
and the crews never stopped evolving. So most of the learning took place at home station, 
but some of the insights only surfaced during the operational use. (#8, Air Force) 
Insights obtained from outside may be aimed at local, specific issues. 
Even when implemented in different situational contexts, they may prove useful and 
effective. 
The idea was mentioned in a SITREP of another ODA. Their situation was 
different from ours, since they were trying to address a specific problem of being targeted 
by snipers and mortars, and they also developed a specific plan connected to the idea. 
But we immediately thought about the idea, and liked it. We started to use the idea, and 
the value of it got proven many times. (#3, Army) 
Theme 6 - Innovation is triggered by an inadequacy or deficiency in the 
unit. 
The preferred understanding of how innovations are initiated is that, 
within a SOF, they happen though planned events. But during the interviews, a pattern 
emerged that showed that innovation is often triggered by the inadequacy or deficiency of 
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a unit. These inadequacies may provide focus and direction, which are key ingredients for 
successful innovation. But this theme could also mean that there is wide room for 
improvement in planned innovation. 
Justification 
Military working dogs have been used before; they have had specific 
tasks, for example, sniffing out explosives, weapons, or drugs. Their wider use with 
troops fighting in buildings was triggered by a need to lower casualties. 
In Iraq, during some heavy fighting over compounds, both our unit and 
our partnership units were taking a high amount of casualties. The initiation of the idea 
was the effort to lower the casualties. Over time, one of the things we developed was the 
use of military working dogs in support of these operations. Their use allowed for better 
awareness and lowered the risk to both forces and civilians. (#6, Navy) 
SOF units are generally smaller than conventional units. Mitigation of 
situations in which smallness is a disadvantage is one possible approach. 
When our coalition partner unit left, we lost a big force. Without that 
backup, I felt the need to find a solution for a much smaller force. The solution I came up 
was based on the precise knowledge of timings related to different Taliban groups we 
were fighting and for the majority of times it worked flawlessly. (#1, Army) 
Exercising control over an area is a challenging task, more so for a smaller 
unit. Identifying and using such leverage was a successfully implemented idea. 
One other SOF officer, from whom I overtook the area, told me a story 
when they had hard time to control the area. In this area, the enemy was very active. And 
my colleague and his team needed to get into a certain valley. As the area was infested 
with enemy, it was hard to gain control. His intelligence sergeant learned about the area 
and he realized the value of lumber which was used by locals to “store” the money into. 
The insight was that who controls the lumber, controls the valley as well. As the team 
needed to get into the valley, they shared this insight with commander of Marines 
company who shared the same firebase with them. Once the Marine commander sent one 
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of his platoons to “sit on the wood” the team was able to get into the valley and achieve 
its tactical objective. After the Marine platoon left, the wood disappeared. (#2, Army) 
Openness to learning a new task is based on the idea that the performing 
the task will help the unit that is supported. In a sense, the ability to perform somebody 
else’s task can free the hands of the other unit. 
Although it is not our task, we learned how to control other aircraft. It 
was never meant to be our mission, and not that the ground party was not able to do it 
either. The idea was to free them to do something else. So we gradually learned how to 
be tactical air controllers without being ones. And all the guys started to bring up ideas, 
and we worked on them. It was a process of a gradual improvement. (#8, Air Force) 
Theme 7 - Seeking new information is limited if the individual or 
organization is limited to a narrow set of missions. 
Focusing on direct action keeps units from seeking solutions across the 
board. A direct-action focus limits the span of training, the quest for new information and 
solutions, and the conduct of missions. The extreme output indirectly caused by such a 
focus can even be mission refusal. 
Justification 
Superiors have many ways how to assess the progress of operations within 
their area of operation. One simple metric is the number of enemy killed. While this is 
probably useful in a conventional war, within a population-centric conflict such an 
approach is not so useful. 
While advising an ODA commander on desired outcome of operation, 
where ODA captain wanted to go after a certain low level individual, as a senior person I 
tried to get across the point that an indirect focus in area is required and low level 
individual has not so much of a value, even if captured. The team commander’s 
motivation was to reach a high number of operations. This metrics was driven by 
battalion commander, who wanted to reach the total of X-hundred operations during the 
deployment cycle. (#14, Army) 
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In extreme cases, refusal to operate per given guidance does occur. The 
problem could be triggered by the unit’s preparation for a different mission set. The given 
task may require an innovative approach, either due to novelty embedded (i.e. a really 
new task) or a different focus in pre-deployment training and preparation. 
After the key leaders from the platoon were reassigned to do exactly the 
expected task (direct action type of mission), the remaining part of platoon could not 
handle the change, and carried on based on their expectations (direct action) and not as 
per given task (long-range desert patrol, reconnaissance). For them to adjust to the task 
given was impossible and they kept doing meaningless raids. (#10, Navy) 
Interviewees mentioned that prior to their deployment, the training was 
focused mostly on kinetic operations, or direct-action missions. 
Training was mostly focused on infantry battle drills and huge emphasize 
was made on the use of CAS. That was the focus of it, once in battle to be able to call 
CAS and hold till it comes. In Afghanistan, the situation and operational needs did not 
reflect those priorities (the security situation was not that dire and fighting skills do not 
help rebuild the governance); and we as an ODA were not capable of the task ahead of 
us. After time, for next deployments, the shift from direct skills towards the indirect ones 
took place and we spent less time shooting and driving and more time learning to 
understand the governance. (#3, Army) 
Our pre-mission training was shooting, flying in helicopters, and direct-
action-related activities. There were no radios (for broadcasting training) and we only 
practiced with loudspeakers. Lack of understanding to our task skewed training towards 
ranges and shooting. So the learning really came after we got deployed. (#9, Army) 
Theme 8 – The larger the unit, the less it is able to innovate and learn.  
With growing size, to innovate and learn becomes harder. It is easier to 
prototype and test on a smaller scale (because it is cheaper), there is a higher 
concentration of high-quality people (it is easier to staff an elite force of a hundred men 
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than of ten thousand), and there tends to be tighter bonds and higher trust (psychological 
safety) among a smaller force.  
Justification 
In comparison to large conventional units, the SOF units are small. And 
some SOF units are even smaller. For them it is easier to innovate, due to freedom from 
restrictions inflicted by the size of a large unit. 
SOF units are expected to innovate are smaller in size than the rest; they 
are given more freedom to do it, since to innovate is much easier on a smaller scale, than 
on the whole scale of government contracting. For larger SOF units it is harder, but it is 
even harder for the conventional units. (#6, Navy) 
With higher-tier units, better support is available, making innovation 
easier.  
Similarly, the size of support structure, the higher within the SOF 
organization, the more support structure there is available. With higher tier unit, more 
supporting experts there are working per operator. (#6, Navy) 
Larger units require large support. But the pool of high quality people is 
not endless. Thus, larger units need to rely on lower-quality personnel to support them. 
With growing size, the number of people supporting grows as well; as 
these numbers are not endless (endless availability of such people), at certain point the 
organization is forced to rely on less motivated, or less skillful individuals. Hawaii tends 
to be more expensive and the schools are not as good there, local citizens live a more 
relaxed lifestyle. For us, it is hard to get people to move there, unless they want to live 
Hawaiian style. Consequently, we have to rely on less motivated (thus less skilled and 
less hardworking people) over there. (#6, Navy) 
Larger units tend to have more complex processes, and with elevated 
complexity come delays and lowered agility of an organization. 
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The bigger the organization, the more rigid it tends to be. Similar to 
startups, they are small, but once they grow, they become more rigid and less innovative. 
(#7, Navy) 
The complexity of internal processes grows with the size of the unit. 
Growing complexity inflicts more rules and SOPs, and thus a SOF unit becomes more 
similar to the conventional one. 
The bigger the unit, the more conventional it becomes, so with growing 
size, the less freedom the unit gets. (#6, Navy) 
Theme 9 – A delay occurs between the moment of insight and its 
application. 
Although information may be available, between the time a subject is 
presented with new information and the time it takes to modify actions accordingly, there 
is a varied delay. Digesting information takes time. Sometimes information may be 
available, but the understanding comes only in retrospect, after the opportunity to use it is 
gone. 
Justification 
Making sense takes time. A person may be too absorbed by other things, 
or data may be too complex to understand at first exposure. Regardless of the reason, it 
may take time to completely understand an event. Lack of understanding can be 
successfully overcome after the opportunity to act is gone. 
We did not see the value of coordinating effort with PRT. We viewed our 
efforts as separate. The understanding that we could do a lot more influence operations 
through them came much later. Between us and the PRT, there was a lot of missed 
coordinated effort. (#2, Army) 
There is a delay of variable length in using the insights gleaned from 
previous training. 
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After three months in Iraq, I realized we did not utilize the Designated 
Marksmanship Program-trained people as we were supposed to. Instead of that, we just 
reacted to fire with everything we had. (#3, Army) 
Even innovation does not occur from day to day. To be innovative takes 
time. 
We worked very hard over time. It took a considerable time to train the 
assets, to develop the infrastructure and to field an innovative solution. (#6, Navy) 
The delay could be caused by narrowing the focus to certain aspects of a 
situation or problem. It may be related to a way of conducting daily tasks. To get over 
this challenging limitation takes time. 
We had some other coalition partners attached to us; they were really 
hard working, but their approval process was very complicated. Due to time restrictions, 
they were never able to go out on mission with us. Later on we realized they were very 
knowledgeable in certain areas. Once we started to utilize them based on these skills, we 
learned a lot from them and they were a great asset. We were five to six months into our 
rotation prior we started to utilize them to their full potential. (#2, Army) 
There can be a long delay between the time the insight or information is 
presented and the time it is used in training or preparation.  
Prior to my deployment in 2007, the vast majority of training was focused 
on kinetic operations, and we did only one key leader engagement during the 
preparation. The situation on the ground required the exact opposite; the vast majority of 
operations conducted were based on indirect approach and key leaders engagements. 
This misbalance started to reflect in training in 2010. (#10, Navy)  
  Theme 10 – Useful training is not always applied in combat. 
During times other than deployment, individuals, teams, and units take 
part in a vast array of courses, training events, and exercises. The purpose of these is to 
broaden their knowledge and skillsets. Often the new knowledge or skills do not get put 
into practice, because the training may be disconnected from the requirements of the 
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operational theatre, or disconnected from current experience (as when training is not 
updated or anchored in present reality). Useful skills may be unattractive or unexciting, 
causing the focus to shift to more attractive but less-needed skillsets. In the field, a unit 
may refuse to employ useful, but possibly more risky, approaches, and a prevailing focus 
on direct skills may be detrimental to indirect skills. 
Justification 
Without understanding a specific mission and lacking proper equipment, 
training might focus on skills, but they may not necessarily be the most critical skills. 
Rather, they are likely to be useful and easy to train. 
During the pre-mission training we did some range time, we were flying in 
helicopters and we practiced some direct action related skills. Since there was no clear 
insight on what we were supposed to be doing, we spent loads of time on ranges. And 
since we did not have any radios to practice with, we practiced with loud speakers. (#9, 
Army) 
Some of the skills trained for are part of conventional training. They are 
useful and might become handy when the opportunity comes, but the perceived risk 
outweighs the possible benefits they might bring. 
Before my second deployment to Afghanistan we were jumping three times 
a month. Before the deployment, commander said to put in any concept of operation, that 
nothing will be seen as silly or wrong. And yet, during the time in Afghanistan, because 
of IED situation I tried to put up a CONOP on going to a certain village where the route 
was 250 km long and to my knowledge it was the worst IED alley I knew of. Multiple 
times I tried to submit the CONOP, and it never worked out. From the answer I got the 
impression that doing something we routinely trained for was much more dangerous than 
to drive through 250 km long route full of IEDs. (#3, Army) 
Although units are trained in wide array of skills, there may be hesitation 
to put them into practice. One possible explanation is risk aversion. 
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Our training has an extremely wide span, we get to be trained in a lot of 
things. I mean we got to train in a very high-profile courses where we learn very high-
profile skills. And yet, when it comes to putting the training into practice, the refusal from 
higher is explained by high risk. But I have never known an SF guy who would be willing 
to take a suicidal mission. So we have skills, we have motivation, and still most of the 
times we are told NO. (#3, Army)  
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VII. CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates SOF as a learning organization. Given the diversity among 
SOF units, this is an ambitious task, not made easier by the slim body of literature related 
to learning organizations. While there is no universally agreed-upon theory of 
organizational learning, this study is built on the findings of major scholars in the field. 
In Chapter I, Part F, “Framework,” a set of ten component variables is introduced. 
These variables are described and their substance explained in Chapter II. As these 
variables differ in their meanings and benefits, they also differ in the way they are put 
into practice. Five of these variables were identified as procedural and five as structural, 
i.e., five are present as practices and five are present within the structure of learning 
organizations. 
This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. The 
quantitative analysis consisted primarily of survey research, aimed at identifying the 
degree to which the ten component variables were present within a typical SOF. This 
approach resulted in a comparison of branches within U.S. SOFs and a non-U.S. SOF 
unit from a NATO country. Qualitative data was drawn from interviews that sought to 
understand how learning within an SOF takes place and how successes and failures to 
learn occur. This approach provided a deeper appreciation of the unique challenges to 
learning within the SOF environment and yielded ten prominent themes in regard to 
organizational learning. Seven themes were related to the acquisition of new information 
and three to the application of information gained. 
The survey and the subsequent analysis of responses yielded multiple results. 
There is a degree of difference in the ability to learn as an organization among the 
different SOF subjects, i.e., a higher degree to which the component variables were 
present. Some of the examined subjects were more prone to, or better conditioned for, 
organizational learning. For some variables, the examined subjects yielded very similar 
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results and scored lower than on most other variables. The lack of ability to fail safely, 
sparse implementation of learning teams, a low degree of psychological safety, and, (with 
the exception of  SEALs), a very similarly focused selection process were variables that 
yielded a similar degree of presence for all subjects. (These are very good ideas, but the 
wording is slightly awkward.  I think your editor should be able to help here).  
The themes that emerged from the interviews were congruent with our 
expectations based on the literature. Because the sharing of knowledge and insight 
requires an environment of psychological safety, knowledge is more likely to be 
exchanged under conditions of open and frank discussion, questioning, and storytelling. 
Written reports and formats are limited as tools because of their mediocre level of 
perceived safety, generally poor quality (e.g., context is usually lacking), and the 
impossibility of asking for clarification and further information.  Moreover, documents 
are cited as unavailable when needed, perhaps lost in the eddy of circulating papers.  
Finally, it is clear that acquiring new insights requires the ability to cross boundaries and 
reach beyond the familiar unit. Those units that achieved open discussion and were able 
to cross bureaucratic and cultural boundaries reported good success in getting or sharing 
new insights and knowledge, and were more successful in learning as an organization. 
Other themes that emerged from this research were the assertion that innovation is 
triggered by inadequacy, that healthy seeking can become limited where there is a narrow 
focus (i.e. the blind spots mentioned by David Garvin), that learning difficulties 
compound as a unit grows, and that there is a troublesome delay between the gaining of a 
new insight and its earliest possible implementation. 
Thus, here are the answers to the research questions posed in this thesis: 
1. What are the internal and external conditions that facilitate rapid learning and 
flexible responses in a SOF unit? Rapid learning is facilitated by an environment of 
psychological safety and through direct interaction, i.e., open and frank discussion.170 
2. What internal processes in a SOF unit can be established to facilitate rapid and 
flexible responses to new information and situations? Establishing processes that allow 
                                                 
170  Section discussing psychological safety is located in Chapter II.  
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safe reporting and creating environments that support open dialogue and discussion are 
supportive to knowledge gain and transfer.171 Training personnel in collaborative skills 
and increasing their ability to cross boundaries helps bring in new ideas and insights, 
especially when the insights originate outside the unit. Conditioning personnel to see 
failure as a valuable part of learning supports the transfer of knowledge and allows faster 
and broader learning.172 The use of temporary learning teams improves knowledge gain 
and sharing.173 
Although these outcomes align with the literature on organizational learning, 
there is a need to recognize their limitations. The research was confined to a narrow pool. 
The analysis of survey responses was based on 123 respondents from eleven countries—
too few to be considered a representative sample of SOFs in general. Similarly, the 
interviews were conducted with U.S. SOF only, and the number of interviewees was 
fifteen. Outcomes from this study should not be treated as final answers to the questions 
raised, but as a starting point for further study on a larger scale with sharper focus. 
For any subsequent inquiry based on this study, the approach taken in support of 
the current research, i.e., the use of two methods was found to offer a balanced outcome. 
The use of both qualitative and quantitative methods yielded a more rounded result—in 
that regard, the approach was useful. However, simultaneously employing two methods 
proved time consuming at best, and the author advises that follow-on research include 
ample time to assure depth and quality in the results. Two researchers working 
collaboratively may be a better match for the dimensions of this inquiry. In any case, the 
author notes that the main advantage of the qualitative method was the depth and details 
of the insights gained. Both sets of data garnered from the present research contain more 
                                                 
171  The details of possible ways how to implement safe reporting in an organization are covered in 
Amy Edmondson’s study on children hospitals. Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, and Anita 
Tucker, “Children’s Hospital and Clinics (A),” Case 9-302-050 (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2007). 
172  Section discussing intelligent failure is located in Chapter II. 
173  Section dealing with learning teams is located in Chapter II., for a greater detail the works of 
David Garvin and Richard Hackman might be useful. Garvin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the 
Learning Organization to Work, Chapter 4, Experience. Richard J. Hackman, Leading Teams: Setting The 
Stage For Great Performances (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002). 
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information than was utilized in this thesis. The author feels that more recurrent themes 
can be prised from the interviews, as well as a wider application of statistical analysis of 
the survey results. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study produced various insights in regard to organizational learning in a 
SOF. Based on data analysis and acknowledging the limitations of this study, the author 
makes five recommendations.  
1. Create Environment of Psychological Safety  
Many of the most important lessons that SOF officers may glean are in the failed 
experiments of their predecessors. As an officer’s experiments yield consequences, it is 
often the unintended consequences that contribute to the growing tacit knowledge of the 
protagonist.  However, if there is no psychological safety that allows failure, the 
protagonist cannot pass key insights and wisdom to his successors. Creating an 
environment of psychological safety is the first and most important step to organizational 
learning. For people to be able to seek, implement, and share new insights, as well as the 
results of implementing those insights, they must feel safe. This is especially true when 
the results are failures and to share the failures might put the protagonist at risk. For 
successful learning in an organization, learning must be balanced between the exploratory 
and the exploitative and knowledge must be shared— both insights and good or poor 
outcomes. People must feel trusted. They must feel that it is not only acceptable, but 
expected, that they fail; and that they can share their failures without fear, shame, or 
vulnerability to retribution.  Lack of psychological safety may be perceived when 
innovative solutions are refused or not supported and people are micromanaged, watched 
too closely, or expected to be strong and successful at all times. Anonymous reporting 
may be a good start to creating safety within an organization. 
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2. Make Use of Failures  
As explored above, failure is always a possible outcome. Not all failures are bad 
and allowing persons to fail may be appropriate sometimes. Failures resulting from a 
planned action, with uncertain outcomes of a modest scale, executed and responded to 
quickly, and located within a domain familiar enough to learn from, are good failures. 
Failure should be used as a learning opportunity. Failures need to be shared as much as 
successes. Repeating a failure may become costly after time; thus they must be reported, 
so they are clearly seen and the opportunity to learn is grasped. 
3. Make Use of Temporary Teams  
Since many of the most important lessons are concerned with issues that cross 
organizational boundaries, using cross-functional learning teams is often better than 
sticking to the unit structure. Temporary learning teams, properly staffed, are more likely 
to make use of diverse approaches and experiences, and some of them cross boundaries 
by their mere existence. Using temporary teams conditions personnel to be comfortable 
with collaboration and become more skilled at collaborating. More information is shared, 
especially when diagonal-slice teams are used, and efficiencies increase within smaller, 
temporary teams. Under conditions of psychological safety, such teams may find new 
insights, ideas, knowledge, and solutions, may balance exploitative and exploratory 
approaches, and may derive answers from a full spectrum of resources.  As the use of 
temporary teams is quick and effective, these teams may help counter delays.  Finally, 
each participant is likely to see a wider perspective than the confines of his unit and its 
history.  
4. Support Sharing  
Sharing knowledge and insight is best done through open discussion. New 
insights often arrive through storytelling and questioning; therefore, conditions for such 
discussions must be created. The opportunity to meet is as important as the perceived 
safety to speak openly. If such conditions occur only within the unit, i.e., the team or 
platoon, the information is not likely to traverse boundaries. Anonymous forums may be 
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a possible solution when geographical dispersion makes it difficult for people to meet or 
if psychological safety cannot be established within the unit. While anonymity supports 
openness by providing safety, once control is imposed over such forums, the 
opportunities to learn are lost. 
5. Leadership’s Role in Creating Psychological Safety:  Model and 
Reward Learning and Innovation  
Leaders need to model what it means to learn from unexpected events or from 
failed experiments.  The literature contends, and the findings in this study reaffirm, that 
this is a core requirement for the creation of psychological safety.  Leaders need to 
overcome status barriers and model for the unit what it means to experience and learn 
from failure.  Further, leaders must recognize that reward and recognition are for 
reinforcing learning efforts. Open recognition of learning and support for innovative 
approaches must be made. For example, people asking tough questions need to be 
appreciated, which promotes openness and sharing. Innovative thinking needs to be 
supported. Selecting appointees who exhibit innovative thinking or ask tough questions 
promotes like behavior within the group and supports learning and innovation in the long 
term. Innovation and learning are not easy, especially in climates that rely on routines. It 
often takes perceived inadequacy and a high level of dissatisfaction to motivate 
innovation. Leaders can make an effort to promote to key positions those people who 
raise hard and challenging points. Managers need to support learning and innovation by 
recognizing it, i.e., by saying “yes” when opportunities to innovate arise, by creating 




APPENDIX A. SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
SOF as a Learning Organization - questionnaire 
You are invited to take a survey for a research study on Organizational Learning 
within SOF community. Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You will not be 
penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. 
There are no direct benefits to your person, however, the survey should contribute to the 
greater knowledge about SOF and shall support SOF innovation. 
The survey is designed to provide information to gain insight on what determines 
and facilitates organizational learning within SOF. 
The overall results of the study will be presented in the thesis, SOF as a Learning 
Organization. 
This survey should take about 25 minutes to complete, and I hope for one hundred 
participants to take part in it. Please note that all survey records and data collected are 
confidential: individuals who decide to participate will not be identified. Your input is 
very important. It constitutes part of data gathered from those who were selected to take 
part. We hope you will choose to participate. However, you are free to stop taking part or 
skip any questions anytime. 
There is a very minimal risk of breach of confidentiality, precautions against 
breach of confidentiality will be employed. Results of the survey will be used responsibly 
and protected against release to unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that 
data collected could be mismanaged. 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact either the Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, kisepp@nps.edu, or the researcher, LTC David Franta, 
dfranta@nps.edu. You may also address questions to the Naval Postgraduate School’s 




1. We hope you are willing to participate in our study. We value and greatly 
appreciate your experience and views. 
 
If you are willing to participate, please indicate below. 
 
 I agree to participate in this survey     
 I decline to participate in this survey 
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Part 1 
Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive it is of your person. 
 
1.1 What country do you serve in? 
 
1.2 What is your service? 
 
1.3 What is your current rank? 
 
1.4 What is your total length of service? 
 
1.5 What is your total length of service with SOF? 
 
1.6 What was your last (current) position within your unit? 
 
1.7 What was your position previous to the last one indicated above? 
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Part 2 
Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
2.1 New situations (with solution unknown) are communicated as learning 
opportunity. 
2.2 New situations (with unknown solutions) are communicated as a challenge. 
 
3.1 In this unit, when innovations are tested and planned for, failure is perceived as 
necessary part of trying out.  
3.2 In this unit, failure is acknowledged as possible, when outcome is uncertain. 
3.3 In this unit, failure is used as a mean to challenge existing assumptions.  
Example of this statement is a situation when inability to comply with current procedure leads to 
reassessment of the procedure itself. 
3.4 This unit increases focus on processes rather than on outcomes. 




       
 
Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
4.1 In this unit, people value new ideas. 
 
4.2 In this unit, people are not afraid to try new methods to improve performance. 
 
4.3 In this unit, people often resist new approaches. 
 
4.4 Frequent experiments searching for new procedures and new approaches to 
tasks are part of normal activities (business as usual). 
 
4.5 This unit has a formal process for conducting and evaluating experiments and 
new ideas. 
 




Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
5.1 In this unit, it is easy to speak up about what is on your mind. 
 
5.2 If you make a mistake in this unit, it is often held against you. 
 
5.3 People in this unit are comfortable talking about problems and disagreements. 
 
5.4 People in this unit are eager to share information about what doesn’t work as 
well as share information about what does work. 
 




Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
6.1 My manager(s) invite(s) input from others in discussions. 
6.2 My manager(s) acknowledge(s) his/her own limitations with respect to 
knowledge, information, or expertise. 
6.3 My manager(s) ask(s) probing questions.  
Example is when asked to provide more background information; related to 
purpose, Why did you say that?” relevancy, Is that relevant to that issue? completeness Is 
there anything you have missed out?, etc. 
6.4 My manager(s) listen(s) attentively. 
6.5 My manager(s) encourage(s) multiple points of view. 
6.6 My manager(s) establish(es) forums and provide(s) time and resources for 
identifying problems and organizational challenges. 
 E.g. Within the unit, or force, there is a formally established and used forum that 
facilitates sharing ideas, issues, concerns, and other inputs aiming for innovation. 




Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
7.1 When a new situation (with solution unknown) arises, your unit responds by 
creating a working team to solve it (cope with it). 
7.2 When looking for a new solution/solution to a new situation (with solution 
unknown), your unit looks for solution using its standard organization. 
7.3 When small (working teams) are used, unit’s leadership makes sure their 




8.1 Your unit can be described as performance oriented. E.g. majority of the effort is 
aimed on execution of current tasks.  
8.2 Your unit can be described as constantly optimizing for execution. E.g. 





Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
9.1 New people for the unit are selected based on their previous training. 
9.2 New people for the unit are selected based on their ability to adapt and 
improvise. 
9.3 New people for the unit are chosen for being problem solvers.  
E.g. new people are chosen based mainly on their ability to synthesize 
information and knowledge to achieve solution. 
9.4 New people for the unit are expected to be conformers, rule followers.  
E.g. new people are chosen based mainly on how much they act in accordance 





Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
10.1 When looking for new solutions, communication within the unit goes through 
standard chain of command (e.g. team/platoon, company, battalion, unit HQ, e.g. 
vertically). 
 
10.2 When looking for new solutions, communication within the unit goes across the 
unit (e.g. team/platoon – team/platoon, company - company, battalion - battalion, 
within unit HQ, e.g. laterally). 
 
10.3 When looking for new solutions, there is enough time to act – reflect – act again 
(maybe differently, e.g. adjust). 
 










Please, respond to each item in terms of how descriptive is of your work unit. 
 
11.1 Newly hired employees in this unit receive proper training. 
 
11.2 Experienced employees in this unit receive periodic training/updating. 
 
11.3 Experienced employees in this unit receive relevant training when shifting to a 
new position. 
 
11.4 Experienced employees in this unit receive relevant training when new 
initiatives are launched. 
 
11.5 In this unit training is valued. 
 




This is the end of the survey. 
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APPENDIX B. RECRUITMENT LETTERS 
Survey initial contact 
[date] 
Dear fellow SOF operator, 
Tomorrow you will receive an email with a link to a brief online survey being 
conducted by a team headed by Dr. Kalev I. “Gunner” Sepp, and consisting of Dr. Frank 
J. Barrett and myself about SOF Organizational Learning. 
This voluntary survey is part of our research about whether and how 
Organizational Learning is (or is not) part of SOF.  This is important because the way a 
SOF organization learns and adapts is often critical to mission success.  What we are 
trying to understand is how SOF senses changes in signals from its environment (both 
internal and external) and adapts, as well as how SOF organizations learn from 
experience and incorporate that learning into their future behavior. 
I am writing in advance because I believe many people like to know ahead of time 
that they will be contacted. The study is an important one, since Organizational Learning 
supports innovation and allows SOF to stay contemporary and adapt to changing 
environments, threats, and opportunities. For this, I believe it is imperative for our SOF 
community to understand and thus increase our ability to learn as organizations. 
Thank you for your time and consideration. It is only with the generous help and 
support of fellow SOF operators such as yourself that we can continue to improve SOF. 
Sincerely, 
David FRANTA 
Student NPS, DA 699 
P.S. To those who support this study, I am always ready to show some 
appreciation in the Trident room. 
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Email with link 
[date] 
Dear fellow SOF operator, 
I am writing to ask your help and support in a study of Organizational Learning 
within SOF community.  
It is my understanding, that you have come from a SOF background and as such, 
you possess a unique set of experiences that can help this study. Moreover, the mixture of 
our DA/699 curriculum students allows for searching for what we have in common, as 
well as what sets us apart. That is why all voices should be heard and listened to; that is 
why every participating operator makes the difference. The survey itself is not long and 
should only take about 20 minutes of your time. Questions asked will be related to 
structures and procedures enabling for Organizational Learning within our organizations. 
Your answers are completely confidential and will be released only as summaries. 
This survey is voluntary. Although I hope you will take part- at any point you may decide 
not to (that includes during the survey itself as well). Since our 699 body is a unique set 
of individuals with unique sets of experiences, I hope you will decide to take part. 
[link] 
And of course, after you take part in survey I hope I will get a chance to treat you 
in the Trident room. 
If you have any questions or comments about this study, we would be very happy 
to respond. At any time, please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, 831-
656-2116, kisepp@nps.edu, or the Student Investigator David Franta, 831-333-6041, 
dfranta@nps.edu.  Questions about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns 
may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, 
USN, 831-656-3864, jkschmid@nps.edu. 
Thank you very much for your help and support of this study. 
Sincerely, 
David FRANTA 





(Last week/ few day ago) I sent a link to questionnaire seeking about your insights 
and opinions about Organizational Learning within SOF community to you; please 
consider taking this short survey today. 
We are truly grateful for your help because in diversity rich environment (as our 
DA/699) every experience and insight makes the difference, and helps us understand to 
the Organizational Learning within SOF community. 
 
If you did not receive a link to the survey, or erased it previously, please let us 
know (Principal Investigator, Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, 831-656-2116, kisepp@nps.edu, or the 
Student Investigator David Franta, 831-333-6041, dfranta@nps.edu) and we will respond 
















(Last week/ few day ago) I sent a link to questionnaire seeking about your insights 
and opinions about Organizational Learning within SOF community to you. 
Some of our fellow SOF operators already responded. The survey is not a long 
one, for it should take only 25 minutes to take it. Consider taking it today. 
We believe that Organizational Learning fosters innovation and as such it offers 
conditions for promising future of our community. 
A comment on our survey procedures. A questionnaire is confidential and at no 
time will your name be asked from you. Protecting the confidentiality of operator’s 
answers is very important to us, as we understand the needs of our greater SOF 
community. 
Your participation is strictly voluntary, although as mentioned before – every 




Student NPS, DA 699 
 
P.S. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me (David Franta, 831-
333-6041, dfranta@nps.edu) or the Principal Investigator (Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, 831-656-






Dear fellow SOF operator, 
Please accept my sincere thanks for taking the survey. 
Your responses are of great benefit to our effort, and with your help we gained a 




Student NPS, DA 699 
 
P.S. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me (David Franta, 831-
333-6041, dfranta@nps.edu) or the Principal Investigator (Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, 831-656-
2116, kisepp@nps.edu). 
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Critical Incident Interview 
SOF as a Flexible Learning Organization 
 




The introduction will be used to explain: 
 purpose 
 timeline 
 execution of this interview 
 Organizational Learning 
 Learning Organization 
 Critical Incident. 
 
Before proceeding any further, are there any questions at this point? 
 
Part 1 – Demographic Questions 
1. Age. 
2. Rank 
3. Years of service 
4. # of deployments 
5. Locations/ operations of deployments while in conventional units 
6. Years with SOF 
7. # of deployments with SOF 
8. Locations/ operations of deployments 
9. Years on teams/ plts 
 
Thank you very much for giving me those answers.  
Do you have any questions so far? 
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Part 2 – Critical Incident Portion 
Critical Incident related questions 
1. Can you describe the time when you had to learn something you did not 
know before and how did the occurrence of a novelty happen?  
2. Can you describe the time when you had to learn something you did not 
know before and the idea/insight originated outside of your team/plt (other than combat 
part of your unit (not teams), other unit, other organization, other coalition partner, or 
member of a host nation)? 
3. Can you describe the time when you had learned something new and you 
planned for it? It could be for example a new TTP, operating procedure and such? How 
did you (who) identify (ied) the need for such innovation? 
4. After a new knowledge has been identified and employed, can you 
describe, how was it shared/ disseminated/ institutionalized? 
5. Today, as we were discussing occurrences of a new knowledge - during 
your time with SOF – can you recall an opportunity when you wished you had have 
learned? 
 
Follow on questions 
Who was the initiator of the idea? 
What were the conditions that lead to identification of a need for such novelty?  
How was it identified, shared, performed, improved, disseminated, integrated?  
Did it stay unchanged, or was it changed after time, has it been improved? 
What were the conditions that lead to a change?  
Who initiated the change, how was it received?  
Were there any challenges with implementing the change? How were they negotiated 
with? 
How did you find the source of knowledge? 
Is the pattern useful – has it been used again? Yes/no, why- how? 
Did the novelty get institutionalized? 
Has any rejection / support by higher occurred? 
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Has the novelty been recorded/ captured? If yes- how? 
Did you have to improvise? 
What was the dynamics of learning? 
 
Part 3 – Final Question 
As a Special Operations Officer, what recommendations (ideas, tips, best practices) 
would you consider using in the future, in order to maximize organizational learning 




Thank you very much for your participation in this interview. 
 
I am very grateful for your valuable insights.
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